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New Zealand's Green Party and Foreign Troop Deployments: 
Views, Values and Impacts. 
1 Introduction 
Most Green parties around the world share a common set of ideals about how international 
relations should be managed.
1
 Their common denominator is a broadly pacifist attitude and 
the rejection of all acts of aggression, war and armed conflict, also known as the approach of 
non-violent conflict resolution. The principle of non-violence is one of the four fundamental 
principles of the Green Party of Aotearoa/New Zealand. The following statement provides an 
adequate characterisation of the general Green outlook on the use of force:  
―If we could eliminate or diminish the reasons for an attack, we could also reduce 
the fear and the sums of money we spend on military activities. If there is no 
solution to human suffering, deprivation, and poverty, to the glaringly unequal 
distribution of wealth, and to the death of small children from hunger and disease, 
then there is also no solution in guns and bombs.‖2  
Unfortunately, armed conflicts remain as a gloomy constant in today‘s world. Accordingly, 
Green parties, which have developed over time from grassroots movements to active and 
vibrant parties in parliaments around the world, have to recognise, review, and address such 
issues in an appropriate political manner. They must examine what kind of defence or security 
policies and actions are compatible with Green principles and under what circumstances they 
are willing to justify the use of force, including foreign troop deployments. As Stephen 
Hoadley has noted: 
―Western governments have a legitimate interest in encouraging law, order, and 
wellbeing in non-Western countries, and have the right to take action to secure 
those interests when other states fail to do so. Western governments should be 
respectful to sovereignty and dignity but their range of possible actions should 
include intervention by armed forces.‖3 
This is a question of considerable relevance for the New Zealand Greens. According to a 
survey published in 2005, over time New Zealand has made a larger contribution to 
                                                            
1 See: The Global Greens, Charter of the Global Greens. Defining what it means to be Green in the New 
Millenium, (Canberra 2001), p.4f & 15f. Available at: http://www.global.greens.org.au/Charter2001.pdf  (All 
internet sources/ web pages have been accessed for a final ‗double-check‘ between the 15th and 17th October 
2010). 
2 Ron Nielsen, The Little Green Handbook. A Guide to Critical Global Trends (Scribe Publications, Melbourne, 
2005), p.212. 
3 Stephen Hoadley, Pacific Island Security Management by New Zealand & Australia: Towards a New 
Paradigm (Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand, Wellington, Working Paper 20/05), p.11. Available at: 
http://www.victoria.ac.nz/css/docs/Working_Papers/WP20.pdf  
6 
 
peacekeeping operations than any other country on a per capita basis.
4
 The country has 
recently contributed forces to numerous regional and global peacekeeping missions, 
including, most recently, those in East Timor, Afghanistan, and the Solomon Islands.
5
  
This thesis draws on these three recent cases to examine the Green Party‘s views on and 
influence over New Zealand foreign troop deployments.  The Greens presented very different 
views on the three cases examined here: while the involvement in the conflicts in East Timor 
and the Solomons apparently met Green standards for the legitimate use of force, and 
consequently was supported by the party, the case of Afghanistan did not. The simple 
questions arising from this are: what factors made the difference? Why was the deployment of 
troops in East Timor welcomed by the Greens, but the SAS-mission in Afghanistan was not? 
What role did ideology, public opinion, national interests, domestic and international 
circumstances, allies, and UN resolutions play in shaping Green perspectives?  
To answer those questions adequately, the three cases are considered in detail. In chapters 
four, five and six historical development of the conflicts, the international and regional 
reaction towards them and their legal backgrounds are described, examined and eventually 
compared to each other, before the question of how congruent the Green Party‘s responses to 
foreign interventions have been with their values can be evaluated. 
Since New Zealand engaged in these conflicts in close cooperation with other nations, it is 
also important to explore how the political interests of the participating states overlapped or 
differed. Which reasons were publicly given as a justification, which unnamed benefits or 
motivations did New Zealand have, how free was New Zealand in its decision making and 
what criticisms did the Greens make about the different cases? And more importantly in this 
context: what kind of impact did the Greens have on the decision making process at a 
governmental level? How were they able to criticise the actions taken? What opportunities did 
they use to put pressure on the different governments making decisions about foreign troop 
deployments over the last decade? 
One important problem for Green parties is what James Page calls ―the emergence of pro-war 
support‖6 within sections of their leadership. This is less of a challenge for New Zealand‘s 
                                                            
4 See: Peter Greener, ‗New Zealand and the Push for Peace: Developing an Independent Foreign Policy‘, in: 
Push for Peace. Commemorating the Past, Reflecting on the Present, Resolving Conflict in the Future, edited by 
Peter Greener (AUT, Auckland, 2005), pp.46-63, p.46. 
5  See the full list of engagements: http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/operations/default.htm 
6 James Page, ‗The Problem of the Pro-War Greens‘, in: Australian Quarterly, Vol. 74 (4), p.23-25, p.23. 
Available at: http://eprints.qut.edu.au/8590/ (accessed 20 October 2010). 
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Green Party than it is for the Australian Green Party, or the German Greens who supported 
the NATO intervention in Kosovo 1999. Yet, in general this is ―something that has not 
attracted much attention in public discourse, possibly because of a dearth of critical analysis 
of Green policy and actions.‖7 This is certainly true of the Green Party of New Zealand. 
Scholarship on the party is limited, perhaps due to its relative youth. Work exploring the New 
Zealand Green Party‘s views on foreign affairs, however, is almost non-existent. By focusing 
on green attitudes to the use of military force, this thesis therefore addresses an understudied 
topic in New Zealand‘s foreign relations, and a topic that should be of use to future 
comparative studies of Green politics globally. 
Because of the paucity of the secondary literature, this thesis draws heavily on primary 
sources: particularly the written policies, statements and views of the party itself. Mostly this 
comes in the form of manifestos, speeches, press releases and the like. These were 
complemented with two interviews with the individual who has arguably been most 
responsible for the shape and content of the Green Party‘s foreign and security policy over the 
last decade, the party‘s foreign policy spokesperson Keith Locke. In addition, information has 
been collected from parliamentary debates (Hansard). In contrast to the sparse literature 
relating to the Greens, there is a reasonable quantity of secondary sources relating to New 
Zealand‘s foreign affairs more broadly.  These are used in chapter two to contextualise the 
Green policy positions against the views taken by other parties and to discuss the changing 
nature of New Zealand‘s foreign policy environment. Sources used include monographs, 
articles, working and briefing papers as well as – again – debates from parliament.  
In summary, this thesis reviews and analyses the Green Party of New Zealand‘s views on the 
use of force in international relations, particularly when that involves the deployment of NZ 
troops. It addresses three key questions: 
1) When does the Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand believe it is legitimate to use 
military force overseas?  
2) How have the Greens attempted to influenced the public debate and the parliamentary 
decision making process regarding to foreign troop deployments?  
3) What impact (if any) did their actions have in the three cases of Afghanistan, East 
Timor and the Solomon Islands?  
                                                            
7 Ibid., p.23.  
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In order to answer these questions adequately, the thesis begins with an introductory review of 
New Zealand‘s foreign relations, highlighting key relevant events in the country‘s diplomacy. 
This chapter will be followed in chapter three by a brief introduction of the Green Party of 
Aotearoa New Zealand, its origins, evolution and influences. The main part of the thesis, 
however, will focus on the country‘s recent foreign troop deployments in East Timor (chapter 
four), the Solomon Islands (chapter five) and Afghanistan (chapter six) and the actions the 
Greens undertook to support or oppose those deployments. How the particular political 
circumstances shaped the nature of these conflicts and the responses to them will be examined 
in the individual chapters. Finally, in the conclusion I sum up what I believe is the Green 
Party‘s position and influence on the use of military force.  I argue that the Greens have 
developed a coherent approach to the issue, giving greatest importance to the international 
legitimacy of the intervention.  They have, however, been pragmatic in some respects when it 
has come to the source of that legitimacy, preferring United Nations support but accepting 
regional endorsement in the case of the Solomon Islands.  Second, I argue that in practice, the 
Greens had a limited influence on New Zealand‘s military deployments.  This has been the 
case even when the party has been involved in supportive relationships with the government. 
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2 New Zealand‘s Foreign Affairs 
There is not a large literature on New Zealand‘s foreign policy. Before the early 1960s, 
foreign policy was a rare topic in political debates.
8
 It has been said that the New Zealand 
public cares more about health, education, taxes and welfare issues than foreign affairs.
9
  
2.1 Public Perceptions 
In a 2005 survey asking about the most important problem facing New Zealand, hardly any of 
the interviewees mentioned topics related to foreign or defence policy,
10
 and that topics 
referring to international relations rarely play a role in determining elections.
11
 According to 
Ramesh Thakur, ―even democratic governments can afford to lead rather than follow public 
opinion‖12, when it comes to international diplomacy. However, David Capie argued that 
depending on international political circumstances, foreign affairs can, and, in fact, already 
have had a notable impact on the public and therefore their voting preferences.
13
 For example 
in the 2005 election ―international themes played a prominent, but not overarching role‖.14 
However, foreign affairs can have a strong impact not only on the public but also on the 
political parties. In 2003, for example, discontent about New Zealand‘s involvement in the 
Afghanistan war led to the split-up of the Alliance Party.
15
 
Even when the two major parties preferred different schools of thought in terms of their 
foreign policy agenda, with Labour following a liberal internationalist/ idealism paradigm and 
National following a classic realism-approach,
16
 it seems not to matter much – generally 
speaking – which party is in power. In the recent past ―almost all foreign affairs legislation 
presented to the Parliament has received near unanimous support. Even with the advent of 
                                                            
8 See: Stephen Hoadley, ‗Foreign Policy‘, in: New Zealand Politics in Transition, edited by Raymond Miller 
(Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1997), pp.296-305, p.297. 
9 See: David Capie, ‗Gone by Lunchtime: New Zealand‘s Foreign Policy Consensus and the 2005 Election‘, in: 
The Baubles of Office. The New Zealand General Election of 2005, edited by Stephen Levine/ Nigel S. Roberts 
(Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2007), pp.317-327, p.317. 
10 See: Stephen Levine, ‗Defence, Politics and the 2005 New Zealand General Election‘, in: The Baubles of 
Office. The New Zealand General Election of 2005, edited by Stephen Levine/ Nigel S. Roberts (Victoria 
University Press, Wellington, 2007), pp.318-339, p.331. 
11 See: Capie, ‗Gone by Lunchtime: New Zealand‘s Foreign Policy Consensus and the 2005 Election‘, p.326. 
12 Cited from: Ibid., p.318. 
13 See: Ibid., p.317f. 
14 Robert G. Patman, ‗New Zealand‘s Place in the World‘, in: New Zealand Government & Politics (4th edition), 
edited by Raymond Miller (Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2006), pp.85-100, p.96. 
15 Further reading: Chapter 6 ‗Afghanistan/ Alliance‘. 
16 See: Jian Yang, New Zealand`s Foreign Policy: independence, realism and idealism, in: New Zealand 
International Review, Vol. 28, No.4, 2003, pp.18-21, p.18. 
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MMP and a multi-party parliament, there has been a continuation of this general consensus.‖17 
This is true, in particular, for the nation‘s Pacific policy and is expected to continue.18 
2.2 History 
Public awareness of international issues has waxed and waned in New Zealand.  International 
issues have often become mingled with domestic issues. For example, when the New Zealand 
Rugby Union decided to exclude Maori players from their team competing on a tour through 
South Africa in 1960, there was a sharp domestic reaction. The public was outraged and 
eventually protest climaxed in the ‗No Maori, No Tour‘ campaign, which brought a 
countrywide awareness of the apartheid regime ruling South Africa. Three years later, France, 
by moving its nuclear testing area into the South Pacific region, demonstrated what powerful 
impact a foreign nation can have on New Zealand. Again, the public‘s capacity to impact 
foreign policy was mobilised, as a nascent environmental movement grew into an anti-nuclear 
protest movement.
19
 When the New Zealand government announced its decision to send 
combat troops to Vietnam in 1965, an energetic peace-movement developed rapidly, although 
there are still debates about just how much influence it had only government policy.
20
 
These three major events, all within the span of five years, brought greater awareness of the 
interaction between foreign and domestic policy and the former‘s increasing impact on life in 
New Zealand. From this point onwards, foreign policy increasingly became a field of interest 
for the media, the academic world, and a popular topic for general public debate.
21
 The 
ongoing increase in academic interest, media coverage, and the continuing improvement of 
international trade-links and political foreign relations serve as proof of the importance of the 
field in New Zealand.
22
 
From the mid-1960s onwards, further challenges and shifts occurred in the countries 
international relations and kept raising public concern. Britain‘s entry into the ‗European 
Economic Community‘ (EEC) in 1973 forced New Zealand towards further diplomatic 
                                                            
17 Winston Peters, ‗Foreign Policy: The Next Five Years‘, in: New Zealand and the World: The Major Foreign 
Policy Issues, 2005-2010, edited by Brian Lynch (New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Wellington, 
2006), pp.9-16, p.9. 
18 See: John Henderson, ‗Pacific Island Issues for New Zealand‘ in: New Zealand and the World: The Major 
Foreign Policy Issues, 2005-2010, edited by Brian Lynch (New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 
Wellington, 2006), pp.131-140, p.132. 
19 See the discussions in Elsie Locke, Peace People: A History of Peace Activities in New Zealand (Hazard 
Press, Christchurch, 1992). 
20 See for example, Roberto Rabel, New Zealand and the Vietnam War: Politics and Diplomacy (Auckland 
University Press, Auckland, 2005). 
21 See: Hoadley, ‗Foreign Policy‘, p.297f. 
22 See: Patman, ‗New Zealand‘s Place in the World‘, p.88f. 
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independence. The fact that Britain remained unable to guarantee appropriate defence and 
protection for New Zealand had also been apparent since World War II. In order to provide 
security for the country, New Zealand‘s governments slowly shifted their focus in diplomatic 
relations towards strong powers like the United States, Australia, Canada, or supranational 
organizations such as the United Nations and the Commonwealth.
23
 
In the last 25 years, New Zealand foreign policy has undergone a period of significant 
transformation. Economic dependence on Europe has declined and it has moved towards 
closer relations with the Asia-Pacific and its neighbouring states in the South Pacific. New 
Zealand adopted a non-nuclear security policy, re-defined its defence priorities, and tried to 
maintain its independence in foreign affairs as much as possible – at the cost of downgrading 
a strategic alliance with the US into a ‗close friendship‘.24 
While most politicians in New Zealand acknowledge that the traditional diplomatic ties with 
Australia, Britain and the United States are essential for New Zealand‘s politics and trade, the 
Green Party believes New Zealand should adopt a more northern European perspective on 
international relations.
25
 They strongly opposed the emergence of the neo-conservative 
movement in the United States during the George W. Bush administration and wanted to see 
New Zealand moving progressively towards closer involvement with multilateral agencies, 
particularly the United Nations. The lure of a possible ‗Free Trade Agreement‘ (FTA) with 
the US in exchange for political ties has little appeal for the Geens, as they interpret such a 
deal as ―going under the economic wing of America, as we were once under the economic 
wing of Britain.‖26 In this context, critics argue that the Greens are jeopardizing New 
Zealand‘s economic growth and forgetting about the cultural and historical similarities New 
Zealand shares with Australia, Britain and the United States.
27
 
2.3 Key Relationships 
Aside from Pacific ties, New Zealand‘s key relationships still include traditional ties with 
Australia, Canada, Britain, and the United States.
28
 In the last decade there has been a greater 
economic focus on Asian partners. Since 1999 New Zealand signed FTAs and ‗Closer 
                                                            
23 See: Ibid., p.86f. 
24 See: Robert G. Patman, Globalisation, Sovereignty and the Transformation of New Zealand Foreign Policy 
Working Paper No.21/05 (Centre for Strategic Studies, Wellington, 2005), p.15. Available at: 
http://www.victoria.ac.nz/css/docs/working_papers/wp21.pdf    
25 See: Yang, New Zealand`s Foreign Policy: independence, realism and idealism, p.19ff. p. 
26 Cited from: Yang, New Zealand`s Foreign Policy: independence, realism and idealism, p.21. 
27 See: Ibid., p.21. 
28 See: Peters, ‗Foreign Policy: The Next Five Years‘, p.12. 
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Economic Partnerships‘ (CEP) with Hong Kong, Singapore, and Thailand, as well as Chile in 
South America.
29
 Particularly with China, there has been a remarkable evolution in the last 
few years, triggered mostly by the Peoples Republic‘s increased demand for imported 
resources and goods. The economic relationship culminated in 2008 with a FTA between the 
two countries. New Zealand‘s closest ally in terms of trade as well as defence is Australia. 
Aside from obvious geographical and cultural links, both countries strengthened their 
economic ties and acknowledged their reciprocal dependency in the 1983 ‗Closer Economic 
Relations‘ (CER) agreement. Since the agreement was signed trade between both countries 
has increased by about 400 per cent. Australia became New Zealand‘s biggest market for 
exports and New Zealand ranks among the top three markets for Australian exports.
30
  
This bilateral relationship is also shaped by the relationship with the US, particularly since 
New Zealand depends a lot on Australia, which in turn retains its alliance relationship with 
Washington. This sort of interdependence can cause problems for New Zealand as ―the bigger 
needs the smaller less than the smaller needs the bigger.‖ 31 Australia is in the comfortable 
position of being able to pay less attention to New Zealand, than New Zealand can afford to 
pay to Australia. In the past, New Zealand‘s positions on the nuclear issue, the cancellation of 
already ordered F-16 jetfighters or the use of force in Iraq and Afghanistan disturbed 
diplomatic relations with the US; and thereby also affected the relations between Canberra 
and Wellington.
32
 Despite this, both Washington and Canberra value New Zealand‘s 
contributions to regional and global peacekeeping missions and influential Australian 
commentators have made positive comments about recent acquisitions and developments in 
the ‗New Zealand Defence Force‘ (NZDF).33  
2.4 The Nuclear Issue 
By the early 1970s, many New Zealanders were deeply uncomfortable with their country's 
support for the war in Vietnam. As a result the newly elected Labour government led by 
Norman Kirk ended New Zealand‘s troop deployment in Vietnam in 1972. However, in the 
                                                            
29 See: Patman, ‗New Zealand‘s Place in the World‘, p.90. 
30 See: Ibid., p.89f. 
31 Colin James, ‗Foreign and Family: The Australian Connection – Sensible Sovereignty or Niggling 
Nationalism?‘, in: New Zealand and the World: The Major Foreign Policy Issues, 2005-2010, edited by Brian 
Lynch (New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Wellington, 2006), pp.29-37, p.30. 
32 See: Murray McCully, ‗A ‘National‘ Viewpoint‘, in: New Zealand and the World: The Major Foreign Policy 
Issues, 2005-2010, edited by Brian Lynch (New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Wellington, 2006), 
pp.19-25, p.21.  
33 See for example, Hugh White ‗New Zealand‘s niche defence force is smart defence,‘ The Age (Melbourne), 10 
May 2005. 
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following three legislative periods, the Robert Muldoon led-National government overturned 
much of the foreign policy consensus. It sidelined an initiative to promote a nuclear weapons 
free zone in the South Pacific and actively encouraged visits by nuclear-powered US warships 
in New Zealand ports. Although Muldoon sent a navy vessel to the Indian Ocean to help 
Britain following Argentina‘s invasion of the Falkland Islands, his governments did not send 
out new troops to participate directly in foreign conflicts.  
Throughout the 1980s, the nuclear issue formed an integral part of the public agenda. The 
Values Party – which had its roots in New Zealand‘s environmental, anti-war and anti-nuclear 
movements – was disorganised and ineffective, so Labour picked up the issue and adopted it 
as its own.
34
 The election of the fourth Labour government under Prime Minister David Lange 
led to a new stance on nuclear weapons and nuclear power. The passage of the  New Zealand 
Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act made the nation‘s territory a 
nuclear-free zone, forbidding the deployment of nuclear weapons and banning nuclear-
powered or armed ships and airplanes. The government‘s course of action was seen as an 
important act of self-determination, sovereignty, and cultural identity. A majority of the 
population backed Labour‘s decision, resulting in a re-election of Prime Minister David 
Lange and the Labour Party in August 1987.
35
 Nowadays the Green Party still stresses this 
particular view on nuclear power: ―New Zealand has clear policy against the use of nuclear 
power.‖36 Nuclear energy is seen as ―expensive, hazardous, and unnecessary.‖37 
The New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act incorporated the 
1985 ‗South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty‘ (SPNFZ), and led to a heavy disruption in 
diplomatic relations between New Zealand and the United States. As a result, the United 
States suspended its defence obligations to New Zealand under the 1951 ANZUS Pact. At the 
same time, New Zealand also began to (re-)emphasize its relations with neighbouring nations 
in the South Pacific.
38
  
It has been argued that the nuclear issue retains the power to bring foreign policy to the core 
of public attention. In 2005, the different views between the two major parties on the 
importance of New Zealand as a nuclear-free zone again helped Labour to bring the National 
                                                            
34 See: Stephen Rainbow, Green Politics (Qxford University Press, Auckland, 1993), p.27. 
35 See: Jonathon Porritt/ David Winner, The Coming of the Greens (Fontana Paperbacks, Glasgow, 1989), p.76, 
226f. 
36 Kennedy Graham, Energy Policy (Full Policy, 12th April 2005). Available at: 
http://www.greens.org.nz/policy/energy-policy 
37 Ibid. 
38 See: Hoadley, ‗Foreign Policy‘, p.300f. 
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Party into public discredit. In the following pre-election-campaign, Labour repetitively 
brought up National‘s mixed messages on the nuclear issue and the Iraq War over. Labour 
successfully defended its parliamentary majority.
39
 As the following passage from the 2005 
speech from the throne suggested, ―New Zealand‘s political culture now mingles questions of 
national identity with the country‘s foreign and defence policy perspective.‖40  
Perhaps New Zealanders were simply more afraid of a possible loss of one of their socio-
cultural core values, than the possibility of nuclear-armed US vessels staying in their 
harbours. Much is made of the fact that the anti-nuclear position has become a vital element 
of the country‘s nationhood and sense of self. Even as a defender of the general use of nuclear 
power in Aotearoa, Ron Smith acknowledges that the nuclear subject was a matter of national 
pride: ―Anti-nuclearism may be the closest thing we have to a state religion, with the 1987 
Act our sacred text and David Lange our first saint.‖41  
Besides the anti-nuclear standpoint, environmental issues very often have a significant impact 
on the decision-making process in New Zealand. New Zealanders are very sensitive about 
their natural environment and politicians have to respect this fact, otherwise it is likely that 
they will not be (re-)elected. The country‘s high dependence on tourism, fishery, mineral 
extraction, forestry, and agriculture result in the comprehension that security and wealth are 
closely linked with a healthy and functional environment.  
2.5 South Pacific  
Despite being a geographically isolated country of a relatively small size, New Zealand‘s 
involvement in world affairs is not to be underestimated, particularly for surrounding island 
nations. New Zealand has significant security interests in the South Pacific arising out of 
historical, constitutional and cultural ties.
42
 Fran Wilde claimed: ―New Zealand is part of the 
South Pacific. […] The Pacific is at the forefront of New Zealand‘s foreign policy 
concerns.‖43 Due to the geographically remote character of the country, New Zealand is 
highly dependent on international trade. This counts even more for the geographically isolated 
island states in the South Pacific. 
                                                            
39 See: Capie, ‗Gone by Lunchtime: New Zealand‘s Foreign Policy Consensus and the 2005 Election‘, p.320ff. 
40 Levine, ‗Defence, Politics and the 2005 New Zealand General Election‘, p.330. 
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In security matters, there is mutual interest in a ―stable, peaceful and economically viable, or 
at least workable, South Pacific.‖44 The region has been and ―will remain the priority area for 
New Zealand foreign policy.‖45 Although New Zealand has a relatively small gross domestic 
product (GDP), and limited military capabilities, it appears as a significant power in its 
neighbouring geographical context.
46
 The region is judged to be ―a part of the world where 
what New Zealand does can have considerable impact‖47. Traditionally New Zealand desires 
to keep hostile powers out of the region.
48
 The nation sometimes plays a big brother role here, 
protecting ‘smaller neighbours‘ interests while at the same time benefiting from this role by 
making itself indispensable. Many of the Pacific Island states rely heavily on aid and about 
half of New Zealand‘s aid goes to the Pacific area.49 As Jon Fraenkel notes, the region 
receives some of the highest levels of aid per capita anywhere in the world.
50
 Six out of eight 
New Zealand‘s aid programmes are directed to the South Pacific.  
2.6 Help in Numbers: The United Nations 
New Zealand has a ―traditional belief in the United Nations‖51 and is generally committed to 
the supra-national organisation. In 2002, New Zealand had over 800 military personnel 
engaged in thirteen different UN-authorised peacekeeping and humanitarian missions.
52
 In the 
following year, the country was ranked first internationally – relative to its population size 
and GDP – for its financial and personnel support for UN peacekeeping operations.53 As one 
of the UN‘s founding members, it strongly advocated the inclusion of human rights in the UN 
Charter
54
 and it has signed all major UN treaties and key conventions since 1945.
55
  
In order for New Zealand to be secure in its geographical place, it needs to align itself with 
major powers like the US through an organisation that can guarantee small powers a say in 
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world affairs. ―External organisations offer states with limited resources the opportunity to 
maximise their diplomatic efforts on the international stage.‖56 It seems obvious that for a 
small state like New Zealand, the benefits of multilateral cooperation outweigh the costs of 
trying to take an autonomous but isolated position in a globalised world.
57
 Furthermore, the 
expansion of mass media, international trade, and foreign direct investment is making the 
world a smaller place, increasing the need to regulate the international arena with new forms 
of global and regional governance.
58
 
The Green Party supports reform of some UN agencies, in particular the Security Council,
59
 
but the strong belief ―that the world would be substantially worse off without the United 
Nations‖60 is acknowledged across all parties. Green politics considers itself to be ―at the 
forefront of efforts to ensure that New Zealand‘s foreign policy includes taking immediate 
steps towards establishing appropriate global institutions to address today‘s global issues, 
including the achievement of sustainable development.‖61  
2.7 Defence Reform 2000 
In 2000, the government of Helen Clark announced a reform of the country‘s defence sector 
which alarmed some Western allies. New Zealand cancelled a deal with the United States 
negotiated by the previous National government. An order of 28 F-16 fighters was given up as 
they were too expensive and not suitable for the country‘s emerging defence posture. Other 
parts of the reform included the retirement of the Air Force‘s A-4 Skyhwaks, and a restriction 
of NZ‘s Navy to two frigates and some basic transport and patrol vessels. Nonetheless, the 
money saved mainly remained in the state‘s defence sector and the Army received the bulk of 
the savings to invest in new vehicles, communications and staff.
62
 After the 2000 reforms, the 
government pushed forward the ‗Defence Long-term Development Plan‘ (LTDP) in 2002. 
This included a NZ$3 billion budget increase to update and replace a range of outdated 
equipment over ten years. In 2005, they additionally pushed through the ‗Defence 
                                                            
56 Patman, ‗New Zealand‘s Place in the World‘, p.85. 
57 See: Patman, ‗Sovereignty, Globalisation and New Zealand Foreign Policy‘, p.61. 
58 See: Patman, ‗New Zealand‘s Place in the World‘, p.88. 
59 See: Keith Locke, Foreign Affairs Policy, Available at:  http://www.greens.org.nz/policy/foreignaffairs 
60 Peters, ‗Foreign Policy: The Next Five Years‘, p.14. 
61 Rainbow, Green Politics, p.60. 
62 See: Patman, ‗The Politics of Security: New Zealand-US Relations in a Globalising World‘, p.73. See also: 
Derek Quigley, ‗The Evolution of New Zealand Defence Policy‘, in: Security Challenges (Volume 2, Number 3, 
October 2005), pp.41-61, p.53ff.  
17 
 
Sustainability Initiative‘ (DSI), committing a further NZ$4.6 billion over the following ten 
years to upgrade the country‘s defence forces to a higher level of capability.63 
The reforms were received sceptically among New Zealand‘s international partners. It was 
interpreted as a degrading of the nation‘s military capability as well as a reduction of its 
defence commitment to its allies.
64
 Shortly after the announcement of the reform, the 
Australian Ministry of Defence published its annual White Paper, containing a very clear and 
unusually direct criticism of Clark‘s decision: 
―We would regret any decision by New Zealand not to maintain at least some 
capable air and naval combat capabilities. Such forces would allow a more 
significant contribution to be made to protecting our shared strategic interests, 
especially in view of the essentially maritime nature of our strategic 
environment.‖65 
Domestic disapproval followed. Academic Robert Patman objected that ―the government 
appeared to be projecting a vision of peacekeeping that no longer corresponded to the military 
realities on the ground.‖66 The leader of the ACT Party, Richard Prebble, went a bit further 
and harshly criticised the reforms. He argued the cancellation of the F16 purchase jeopardized 
New Zealand‘s relations with the US, and accused Helen Clark of being driven by her 
personal anti-American beliefs.
67
 He also declared the signing of a Free Trade Agreement 
between NZ and the United States highly unlikely, and argued that, as a result, New Zealand 
would be irrelevant to future major US foreign policy decisions.
68
 Apparently, Prebble left 
open how relevant New Zealand had been to former US foreign policy decisions in the past.  
The US government chose not to comment publicly, but signed a FTA with Australia in 2004. 
NZ was excluded, and although privately New Zealand officials regarded the deal as a poor 
one, its conclusion further complicated trilateral relations between Canberra, Washington and 
Wellington. Patman believed that there are strong associations between the 2000 defence 
reform – as well as NZs position on the nuclear issue and the agricultural sector – and the lack 
of an FTA with the United States.
69
 However by 2004, New Zealand had already contributed 
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SAS troops and some military equipment to Afghanistan for two years, and the support for the 
US-led invasion was a political signal that led to a short term improvement of the diplomatic 
relations between NZ and the US.  
2.8 Iraq War 
The US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 put an abrupt end to what had been a slow improvement 
in diplomatic relations between New Zealand and Washington.
70
 The refusal of the Labour-
led government to participate in the invasion of Iraq, which was not authorized by the UN, led 
to new cooling in diplomatic ties. Prime Minister Helen Clark emphasised shortly after the 
American announcement of the military operation: ―I want to state again, for the record, that 
this government will not be assisting a war for which there was no case at this time.‖71 The 
US government subsequently expressed its disappointment by not identifying New Zealand as 
a top-ranking ally in their following defence report. However, New Zealand had not been 
identified as an ally of the US since it was excluded from ANZUS in the mid-1980s, so this 
did not mark a major reversal of fortune.  
In an analysis regarding New Zealand‘s future foreign and security policy challenges the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) had already affirmed in 2000, that being 
categorised as a friend rather than an ally of the US was an acceptable position for New 
Zealand. The document acknowledged the immense impact of US foreign policy on New 
Zealand, but underlined the point that New Zealand had its own interests and perceptions 
which did not always have to match with the US‘s political course and activities. Aware how 
much New Zealand depended on US support in case of an attack, the report naturally 
expressed the wish to have a good defence relationship with the US.
72
 Regardless of the 
former exclusion from ANZUS and more recent diplomatic rupture with the US, New 
Zealand backed the US-led 1990-91 Persian Gulf War, and the US-UN 1992/93 intervention 
in Somalia, and took a leading role in the conflict resolution in East Timor in 1999.
73
 It also 
provided personnel to Afghanistan from 2001 onwards and took a vital role in the Regional 
Assistance Mission in Solomon Islands (RAMSI) since 2003. In 2010, the New Zealand 
Defence Force contributed to a variety of peacekeeping and peace-building missions around 
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the world, including countries like Afghanistan, the Solomon Islands, East Timor, Iraq, Sudan 
and a few more.
74
 
The thesis will now turn to the most recent of those cases.  But before doing so, some words 
of introduction on the Green Party of New Zealand are necessary.   
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3 The Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 
3.1 History 
Green Parties in Europe, Oceania and the Americas have emerged as an important 
international political force in the last 20 years. A central policy of the Greens is a 
commitment to peace and non-violence. However, with increasing political success and thus 
greater share in power, Green politicians have found themselves faced with the need to take a 
position on foreign conflicts. It is here that Green ideals and the realities of practical politics 
intersect. Green parties have to prove that they are able to act reasonably and with 
responsibility in government, but also in ways that are consistent with their values. The 
actions of the Green Parties around the world indicate that when faced with a situation of 
conflict, their commitment to peace is not always as clear as it would appear. As several 
Green Parties have supported military actions in the past decade or so, critics have 
increasingly argued that they have abandoned a genuine commitment to peace and non-
violence. Australian James Page warned: ―Those committed to peace and non-violence ought 
to think carefully before supporting the Greens.‖75  
How have these issues been resolved in New Zealand?  How did the Green Party of Aoteaora 
New Zealand balance its support of recent Labour governments which have dispatched troops 
to Timor, the Solomon Islands and Afghanistan, with its broader commitment to non-
violence? When and under what circumstances do the New Zealand Greens see the use of the 
country‘s armed forces as legitimate?  To understand these issues, it seems helpful to begin 
with the origins of New Zealand Green movement. 
3.2 The Values Party 
In May 1972 a meeting at Victoria University in Wellington initiated the Values Party, which 
is widely believed to be the world's first national Green party.
76
 Focusing mainly on domestic, 
environmental and social issues, the party gained some mentionable election successes during 
the 1970s – partly caused by the Zeitgeist of the time. Stephen Rainbow described the 
political circumstances of this era as follows: ―In an Australian and New Zealand context, the 
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respective Labour Parties had become barely distinguishable from their traditional 
conservative opponents.‖77  
At the time, New Zealand‘s involvement in the Vietnam War was deeply unpopular, 
especially among young people.
78
 Although Values strongly opposed the war and campaigned 
strongly on environmental issues, under the ‗First Past the Post‘ (FPP) constituency-based 
system it had little chance of gaining representation in parliament, even with a remarkable 
number of votes – 5.2 per cent at the highest in 1975. Values remained mainly as a protest 
movement with little political infrastructure. While Green parties in other parts of the world 
began to develop on a professional level during the 1980s, entering the first regional and 
national parliaments,
79
 New Zealand‘s Values/ Green Party ―existed largely in spirit rather 
than in practice.‖80  
In 1985 the bombing of the Greenpeace vessel Rainbow Warrior re-energised the 
environmental and anti-nuclear left, which had already found encouragement from the 
election of Lange‘s Labour government the year before. The incident prompted deep 
disruptions in the relationships between New Zealand, Australia and France, but it also 
triggered an enormous public interest in the nuclear issue.
81
 In the following years, new social 
movements unified their efforts in the Values Party. However, it was not before the general 
election in 1990 that Values was reanimated by the newly formed Green Party.  
In a survey published in 1991, a wide range of political party delegates were asked if they 
thought the government was spending too much, too little or about the right amount of the 
national budget on a number of social and welfare problems. While nearly all parties agreed 
the government was not spending enough or about the right amount of money on topics like 
education, unemployment issues, health care or environmental issues, only the Greens and 
Labour‘s splinter party New Labour made very clear that, in their opinion, the government 
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was spending far too much money on defence. Labour‘s opinion pointed in the same direction 
but was less clear, while National Party supporters claimed the government was not spending 
enough on defence.
82
 Although only indicative, the result gives some sense of the views of 
party grassroots members on the armed forces generally.  
3.3 The Alliance Years 
In 1990, the new Green Party won 6.8% of the votes cast, but because of the FPP-system did 
not have any seats in parliament.  As a result of this disappointment, the five-party Alliance 
was formed in 1991. Founding member parties besides the Greens were the New Labour 
Party, Manu Motuhake, and the Democratic Party. (They were later joined temporarily by the 
Liberal Party.) The Alliance defined itself as an alternative to the New Right position both 
Labour and National had taken since the mid-1980s. The Greens played a significant role in 
the policy and organisation of the Alliance with Green Party representative Jeanette 
Fitzsimons serving as the Alliance‘s policy co-coordinator.83 Simultaneously, the Green Party 
restructured itself and became more organised and professional during the early 1990s. Party 
members developed a constitution, discussed strategic thinking and worked on the party‘s 
fundamental political direction.
84
 They realized that they needed to overcome a perception 
that ―green politics is a minority politics, rarely attracting the support of more than 10 per cent 
of voters.‖85  
After gaining 18 per cent, but only two parliamentary seats, in the 1993 general election, the 
Alliance expressed the need for a more pluralistic parliament and fought for a reform of the 
New Zealand election system.
86
 After an electoral referendum in the same year the new 
electoral system was adopted.  The ‗Mixed Member Proportional‘ (MMP)87 system was used 
for the first time during the election in 1996 and it redefined the political landscape, giving 
smaller parties a much greater chance for representation in parliament. In five MMP elections 
since 1996 both Labour and National have retained their place as the two leading parties, but 
neither has been able to win a clear majority in the House. The results have always required 
them to form coalitions with smaller parties.  
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Although MMP provided an enormous opportunity for the Alliance, the grouping was 
undermined by its patchwork character. The party had to present itself as a united group to the 
media, its voters and other parties, when really it was a fragile framework straddling five 
different viewpoints on major political issues.
88
 The Greens were dissatisfied with the 
decision-making process and felt under-represented in the Alliance. As a consequence they 
left the Alliance in 1997 and developed a separate policy platform to contest the 1999 election 
as a sovereign party once more.
89
 
3.4 The Green Party 
The 1999 election seemed to validate the choice to leave the Alliance.  Across the country, 
Greens won 5.2% of the votes cast, sending seven Green MPs  to parliament.
90
 A Green 
coalition agreement with Labour and the parties remaining under the Alliance‘s umbrella was 
worked out but never signed. Instead, Labour negotiated a coalition agreement with the 
Alliance without the Greens. However, the Greens supported the government in a confidence 
and supply agreement. In return they got limited input into the budget and legislation 
procedures. The Greens first started to make a impact on national policy through debating and 
voting in parliament. At the current time, the Greens are the only minor party under MMP 
which has continuously seen its support remain above the critical 5 per cent threshold 
required to enter the national parliament.
91
  
Their policy and political achievements in the following years were mainly focused on 
domestic and environmental issues but also included their vote against the resolution to 
deploy SAS troops in Afghanistan and their opposition to the ‗Terrorism Suppression Act‘ 
(TSA) in 2001.
92
 At the 2002 election the party gained 7 per cent of the votes and was able to 
put nine Green MPs into Parliament. Again, they did not establish a formal coalition 
relationship with Labour. A planned confidence and supply agreement was cancelled due to 
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Labour‘s plans to allow genetic engineering in New Zealand, and the Greens went back into 
opposition. Although the Greens no longer had a significant influence on the national budget-
spending, they maintained a practical working relationship with the government, and thereby 
remained involved in the legislative process to a certain extent. In the 2005 election, the 
Greens lost some of their voters and gained only 5.3 per cent, which still enabled them to 
return six of their MPs to Parliament. This time, they were able to negotiate a cooperation 
agreement with the ruling coalition made up of Labour, United Future and New Zealand First 
party. The agreement enabled them to have a limited input into the budget and offered them 
broad consultation on policies. The Co-operation Agreement, however, was strongly focused 
on domestic policy issues and referred to New Zealand‘s foreign policy only under the title of 
‗Peacemaking‘. The agreement could be read as signalling the Greens acceptance of Labour‘s 
general direction in international relations and that any differences about key foreign issues 
were to be worked out at the leader level.
93
 
After the general election in 2008 the Greens had increased their share of the vote to 6.72 per 
cent, which was equivalent to nine MPs, making them the third biggest faction in 
parliament.
94
 During the election campaign the Greens rejected the suggestion of talking to 
the National Party about a possible coalition.
95
 Nevertheless, after the election the Greens 
signed after the election a Working Relationship with the John Key-led National government 
to support a $323 million home insulation fund.
96
 Except for this practical and narrow 
agreement the Greens remain in opposition against the current single party minority 
government of National, supported by ACT, United Future and the Maori Party.  
3.5 Visions, Values and Principles 
In the beginning of the Values Party era, during the early 1970s, a diversified mix of 
ideological ideas from an equal-rights, environmental issues and peace movement background 
came together; delivered by the contemporary new social movements. Spiritual thoughts 
about political existence and environmental concerns dominated the discussions. ‗Utopia‘ 
played an important role in New Zealand‘s self-perception. In its geographic isolation it 
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seemed like an ideal spot for a political experiment. The establishment of new social norms 
and patterns should lead to a new form of society, living in an ‗Ecotopia‘.97 
Nowadays the Greens still take some pride in their progressive inner structure. In 1974, Cathy 
Wilson became New Zealand‘s first female party Deputy Leader, followed in 1979 by 
Margaret Crozier who is considered as the nation‘s first female party leader. Robin Duff 
functioned in 1978 as the first publicly out gay candidate.
98
 John Wilson argues that the Green 
Party is the most organisationally democratic political party in NZ, because of its ―emphasis 
on membership participation, decision-making by consensus, gender balance, Maori, 
representation, co-leadership, and candidate selection procedures.‖99 Equal rights are a key 
value of New Zealand‘s Green Party and these rights do not only count for the motherland but 
have the requirement to work internationally. Thereby such values should also count for and 
affect the party‘s approach towards foreign affairs.  Rainbow indicated that at an early stage 
of the party‘s self-definition; he claimed Green politics ―must be concerned with more than 
the environment [and] it must learn from modern political history in their future political 
designs‖100. 
Today the Greens know how to send out positive, popular and clear statements. Keith Locke 
states in the party‘s Foreign Affairs Policy: ―We envision a world where people respect each 
other and the natural environment.‖101 Under point six of their Long Term Goals-manifesto 
the Greens avow themselves to a pacifist principle: ―Negotiation, mediation and peacemaking 
are the primary means of resolving conflict.‖102 Like many other of their charter formulations 
in regards to their goals, values, and visions, this can be interpreted as a statement on both an 
individual and a global level.  In regards to international relations they specify: ―The main 
focus of New Zealand‘s international work is environmental integrity, peace, and justice and 
human rights.‖103 Non-violent conflict resolution is seen as ―the process by which ecological 
wisdom, social responsibility and appropriate decision making will be implemented. This 
principle applies at all levels.‖104  
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In their Vision, the Green Party claim they ―will work towards a goal of a world without 
armed conflicts where there is a just distribution of global resources, governments respect 
human rights and disputes are settled peacefully. Armed disputes cause much suffering, social 
and economic dislocation and environmental damage.‖105 The key to this goal must be 
working to promote peaceful conflict resolution across the globe. As the Greens know about 
New Zealand‘s limited influence in world politics, they take a stronger focus on the South 
Pacific and take a role model position in the region.
106
  
3.6 Multilateralism 
The key principles for the Green foreign policy agenda are based on universal human values: 
freedom, tolerance, equality, non-violent resolution of disputes, respect for human rights, 
respect for other species and the environment, and a shared responsibility. Therefore, the 
party claims, New Zealand's foreign policy should also respect the national values of 
egalitarianism, self-reliance, pragmatism, tolerance and multi-cultural respect. In terms of 
conflict resolution and foreign troop deployment the Green Party seeks to outlaw aggression, 
make trade fair, restrict foreign troop deployment, legislate for a nuclear-free world and 
reform parts of the UN body, in particular the Security Council.
107
 The party seeks to use 
―appropriate international legal instruments to promote human rights and democracy, 
including UN agencies.‖108 They acknowledge the fact that New Zealand lives in a conflict 
prone world and therefore accept and support the establishment of conflict prevention, 
mediation, as well as peacekeeping-units within the UN Secretariat.
109
 The Green Foreign 
Policy Agenda recommends: ―The United Nations […] should develop a standing preventive 
deployment force, with a robust mandate, which can be deployed by the Secretary-General 
acting under Security Council authority, within 48-hours of a request by any country.‖110 
Expressing willingness to commit New Zealand‘s defence forces to such UN-missions, the 
Greens also state in their ‗Defence and Peacekeeping‘ manifesto:  
―In order for the NZDF [New Zealand Defence Force] to fulfill its roles properly, 
the Green Party believes that New Zealand should ensure its armed forces can 
operate across a range of operations, from peacekeeping through to more 
conventional defence operations, with a clear strong focus on peacekeeping, 
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disaster relief and resource protection. New Zealand should also continue to 
develop an independent defence policy, but be prepared to operate multilaterally 
with other countries if appropriate.‖111 
Although it is not explicit, this centrality accorded to multilateralism implies that foreign 
interventions should be recognized, approved and mandated by the UN. To meet these 
standards and to simplify the decision making process within the UN they seek to negotiate an 
agreement ―with the UN Dept. of Peacekeeping Operations (UN-DPKO) with a view to 
making units of the NZDF available to the UN under the Stand-by Arrangement System 
(UNSAS) at the shortest feasible time (aiming at 48 hours).‖112 However, if sanctions or 
intervention are not approved by the UN, they call for New Zealand to consider its role in the 
world more independently. A concrete manifestation of this position that they would support 
was New Zealand‘s refusal to participate alongside the United States, Britain and Australia in 
invading Iraq.
113
  
Above all, the Green Party stance sees peace between individuals and nations as an ultimate, 
desirable, and enduring goal.
114
 The key tool to reach that goal is the strengthening of 
international law and multilateral cooperation, along with addressing the ―differences of 
wealth between countries, through richer countries meeting their aid obligations.‖115 
3.7 Use of Force 
After the events of 9/11, international perceptions about the legitimate use of force began to 
change. The ‗global war on terror‘ justified the use of military power to defeat and deter the 
threat of transnational terrorism. From a Green perspective this focus on hard power does not 
provide a promising solution in the long term. Ron Nielsen‘s view, that ―the use of force and 
the use of boastful and arrogant language, only plays into the hands of terrorists and increases 
their support‖ is widely shared by Greens.116 Besides their commitment to non-violence the 
Greens preferred to give priority to challenges in New Zealand‘s immediate neighbourhood. 
The reduction of military equipment, and the development of a defence force specialized in 
disaster relief, resource protection and rescue missions, are seen as a steps in the right 
direction. The Greens support investments in related maritime surveillance and naval 
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capabilities.
117
 A powerful argument they make is cost. A lighter army costs less than a heavy 
military.  
The Greens have developed their own framework to evaluate the legitimate and appropriate 
use of military force and the necessity of armed interventions. In this view, force should only 
be used as a last resort, in circumstances where there has been inter-state aggression or intra-
state situations of genocide, or in cases of gross and systematic violation of human rights. The 
blessing of the United Nations is key. If the Greens were to achieve significant power in the 
parliament, the party desires to work towards legislation which forbids New Zealand‘s armed 
forces from participating in any military action outside the nation‘s borders without a UN-
mandate. An intervention can then only be justified under the responsibility to protect 
doctrine which is supposed to evaluate the seriousness of the actual threat, the proper purpose, 
the last resort possibilities, proportional means and the balance of possible consequences.
118
  
They also acknowledge the right of self defence, but claim the use of force must in every case 
be legitimated through the consent of New Zealand‘s population.  
These concerns about human rights go beyond the nature of interventions. The Greens also 
declare that the government ―has a responsibility to ensure that the NZDF does not engage in 
training or joint military operations with nations who are using their military to suppress 
human rights or unjustly seize natural resources in their own or other countries.‖119  
This framework is not without its challenges.  One the one hand, the Greens support working 
with other governments and endorse co-operation in terms of humanitarian assistance, disaster 
relief and search and rescue missions. But on the other hand they also demand New Zealand 
assert its independence of New Zealand and reject ―participation in the ANZUS Treaty, the 
Five Power Defence Arrangement and the UK/USA intelligence agreement [that may be 
related to] the NZDF mission.‖120. This strong support for the United Nations and human 
rights, but opposition to the use of military force in the war on terror leads to some nuanced 
positions.  As we will see below, the Greens strongly opposed New Zealand's involvement 
and support in the US-led operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, they still support the 
regional UN peace-building efforts in the latter.
121
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4 East Timor 
To understand the Green Party‘s views on the conflict in East Timor, and their reasons for 
supporting New Zealand‘s contribution to a multinational intervention in the province, it is 
helpful to begin with a brief history of East Timor‘s development and the origins of the 
humanitarian crisis that prompted the 1999 intervention. 
4.1 The Era of Colonisation 
East Timor/ Timor-Leste was colonised by the Portuguese in the 16
th
 century and was then 
known as Portuguese Timor. The province was mainly used by the Portuguese as a penal 
colony, where they exiled political prisoners as well as ordinary criminals. During World War 
II, the Japanese occupied Timor in 1942, but the Timorese and their allies engaged them in a 
constant guerrilla campaign. Portuguese Timor was handed back to Portugal after the war; 
however, very little investment had been made in infrastructure, education and healthcare. 
Only a small minority of the Timorese population had received some level of education. Local 
authority rested with the Portuguese Governor and the Legislative Council as well as local 
chiefs in rural areas. After the fall of the Portuguese fascist regime in 1974, an independence 
process for East Timor was encouraged by the new, democratic Portuguese government. This 
was mainly expressed through a progressive legalisation as well as the establishment and 
support of new Timorese political parties. In the first local election in March 1975 the 
‗Timorese Democratic Union‘ (UDT) emerged as the largest party; partly as a result for their 
association with the popular independence movement.
 122
   
These developments were watched closely by Indonesia as well as Australia.  Australia's 
former Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam, had developed a close working relationship with the 
Indonesian leader Suharto. He told Suharto in 1974 that an independent Timor would be ―an 
unviable state, and a potential threat to the stability of the region.‖123 He suggested an 
Indonesian intervention and claimed integration with Indonesia would be in Timor's best 
interests. The United States had also expressed concerns over the Timorese moves. With 
Indonesia as an important ally in the Asia-Pacific, Washington feared the Indonesian 
archipelago could be destabilised by a left-wing regime in its midst. Consequently, the 
                                                            
122 East Timor Government, ‗History‘. Available at: http://www.easttimorgovernment.com/history.htm 
123 Ibid.  
30 
 
Timorese unilateral declaration of independence on 28 November 1975 was not recognised by 
Indonesia, Australia, or – surprisingly – Portugal.124 
4.2 Indonesian Invasion 1975 
Indonesian troops launched an invasion of East Timor on 7December 1975. On the day before 
the invasion, Suharto met with US President Gerald Ford and Foreign Minister Henry 
Kissinger. According to declassified documents released by the National Security Archive 
(NSA) in 2001, Ford and Kissinger approved the invasion and had agreed to supply the 
Indonesian forces with US military equipment. An estimated 200,000 East Timorese, nearly 
30 per cent of the original population, died during the invasion and its aftermath.
125
 The 
Australian government protested loudly in public after the event, but had previously provided 
private assurances to Suharto that no substantive action would be taken. However, Australian 
policy proved unpopular among the Australian public, and as explained further below, 
eventually led to public pressure on the government to support the East Timorese 
independence movement some 25 years later in 1998/99. The occupation of East Timor 
remained a publicly discussed issue in numerous nations, in particular the former colonial 
power Portugal – but also New Zealand. The United Nations refused to recognise either the 
regime installed by Indonesia or the subsequent annexation.
126
  
4.3 ASEAN and the Case of East Timor 
The annexation also had an impact on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
the regional grouping formed by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand in 1967. ASEAN mainly offers its members a forum where disputes can be 
discussed peacefully. The organisation was founded after several crises in the region, and one 
of ASEAN‘s main purposes had always been the maintenance and protection of peace and 
stability between its members. ASEAN members agreed not to support opposition movements 
in neighbouring states, particularly those movements marked as illegal, including all sorts of 
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support or sanctuary for all kinds of groups who would try to undermine the government of an 
ASEAN state.
127
 
During the early stages of its development, ASEAN placed a high priority on the principle of 
non-intervention. Non-intervention, sovereignty, and the legal equality of states, were seen as 
the three basic rules underlying all accepted and expected forms of behaviour in international 
relations. The non-intervention rule characteristic to all ASEAN arrangements is ―of course a 
re-affirmation of the non-intervention norm that has long been a crucial part of the United 
Nations system.‖128  
The first Article of the 1945 enforced UN-Charter highlights the principle of equal rights and 
self-determination, while the second Article assures the principle of non-intervention. This 
creates a dilemma insofar as it has to be defined how to maintain both the principle of non-
intervention and the provision of human security for potential human right abuse. As Anthony 
Smith noted, even in cases of human rights abuses or cases of genocide, there remains no 
―magic formula to determine when the international community should intervene.‖129  
John Funston raised the idea of not equating non-intervention and non-involvement. In recent 
years ASEAN became more flexible in those regards since it recognises the need for getting 
involved in the economic affairs of its member states – however, the association is still 
reluctant to intervene in other states‘ domestic affairs with the use of force. Mutual political, 
social, or economic interests encourage cooperation between states and supranational 
organisations, which in case of crises with possible spill over effects necessitate it in order to 
oppose such external threats. Nevertheless, human right issues, the protection of the 
environment, as well as the promotion of democracy, have all been used recently by some 
states, including ASEAN member states, to justify an intervention in another state‘s domestic 
affairs.
130
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The uncontested annexation of East Timor by Indonesia in 1975 clearly demonstrated the 
unquestioned attitude regarding the principle of non-intervention in the ASEAN community. 
ASEAN‘s silence regarding the annexation was explained by reference to Indonesia‘s 
sovereignty. There was a great reluctance to disturb relations within the newly established 
ASEAN community. An important factor for the associations (non-) reaction was Indonesia 
supremacy. Indonesia had been, and still remains, the most powerful country in the ASEAN 
organisation.
131
  
When Indonesian security forces killed between 50 (according to official figures) and 270 (the 
widely reported unofficial numbers) East Timorese during a funeral procession in Dili in 
1991, ASEAN‘s criticism remained muted – again to preserve harmony and solidarity 
between the ASEAN states.
132
 However, the so called Dili Massacre had a profound effect on 
global public opinion, leading to a turning point in terms of international sympathy for the 
East Timorese case.
133
  
During the East Timor crisis in 1999, ASEAN again came under severe criticism for being 
unable to provide a concerted action to protect the East Timorese people from the ongoing 
human rights violations in their country. The organisation‘s strict adherence to the principle of 
non-interference was seen as too conservative, and inappropriate for the situation in Timor.
134
 
As a result, the political significance of the organisation was downplayed by its critics, who 
characterised the association as ―primarily an economic entity that provides valuable and 
voluminous amounts of natural resources to the major economic power-houses within Asia-
Pacific. […] Put simply, ASEAN is fundamentally viewed by the major Asia-Pacific powers 
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as being essentially a trading organization.‖135 It was also criticised for being ineffective and 
slow, unable to present solutions to economic or political crises, and essentially amounting to 
little more than a ―talk shop‖136.  
4.4 Referendum and Crisis 1999 
It was not until Suharto‘s resignation in 1998 that Jakarta moved forward, offering East Timor 
autonomy within the Indonesian state. In 1999, the Indonesian government under its new 
President, Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie, decided – under strong international pressure – to hold 
a referendum about the future of East Timor.
137
 This development was welcomed by the New 
Zealand Greens as they had traditionally argued in favour of East Timor‘s right of self-
determination, and had continually pushed the New Zealand government to put pressure on 
Indonesia in this regard.
138
 
The United Nations supported and sponsored the referendum held on 30 August 1999. With 
the decision on the referendum having been made several months before the actual ballot, and 
the political situation in the province still unstable, New Zealand‘s Green Party called for an 
international police force, including personnel contributions from New Zealand, to supervise 
the referendum process.
139
 At the same time, the Labour Party questioned the government on 
its plans to update the New Zealand Army‘s equipment to ensure an adequately prepared 
peacekeeping force could be sent to East Timor. National Minister of Defence Max Bradford, 
however, denied any comment on the matter. He also did not yet expect NZ troops to be 
deployed to East Timor.
140
 
The ‗UN Assistance Mission in East Timor‘ (UNAMET) arrived in East Timor in May 1999, 
accompanied by UN-observers and the electoral teams. UNAMET also brought 300 
international civilian police, including ten officers from New Zealand, and 50 military liaison 
officers to the country.
141
 After three people died in a clash between Indonesian anti-
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independence groups and Timorese protesters on 26 August 1999 Green Party MP Keith 
Locke asked Foreign Minister Don McKinnon not to withdraw the ten New Zealand police 
officers in East Timor. Locke said that they would be needed in the conflict more than they 
were required at home, and he welcomed a possible deployment of 15 additional officers in 
late September.
142
 However, the security situation in Dili degraded dramatically during the 
following days.  
Events surrounding the referendum generated increased international interest for the East 
Timor case. UNAMET accredited nearly 3,000 staff for the vote; some 600 journalists and 
more than 2,300 international observers were in Dili to supervise and report on the election.
143
 
The ballot‘s result showed overwhelming support for the independence of East Timor. On 4 
September 1999 United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced that 78.5 per cent 
had voted in favour of independence, with only 21 per cent of the population backing the 
alternative, status as an autonomous state under Indonesian rule.
144
  
After the result was announced, violent clashes occurred in Dili and anti-independence 
militias fired shots near the local UN compound.  Indonesian-backed paramilitaries carried 
out a concerted campaign of violence and terrorism. In the towns of Maliana and Ermera, 
houses and shops were burned down by a looting mob. UN staff had to be evacuated from the 
towns of Los Palos and Same after militiamen went on a rampage.
145
 Many supporters of the 
independence movement were assassinated, nearly 70 per cent of East Timor's infrastructure 
was destroyed, and more than 200,000 East Timorese either fled or were forced to move 
across the border into West Timor.
146
 
The jailed East Timorese opposition leader, Xanana Gusmao
147
, immediately called on the 
UN Security Council to send an international peacekeeping force to the territory: "I appeal to 
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the secretary-general of the UN to convene an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council 
to decide on the sending of multinational forces to save the Maubere (East Timorese) people 
from a new genocide,"
148
 he wrote in a letter to the Council.
149
 UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan shared Gusmao‘s view, and called for an end to the violence. Nevertheless the riots 
continued, leading to the deaths of at least four UN staff and a reported 24 civilians in 
Maliana.
150
 The Indonesian government‘s attempts to get the situation under control failed 
since large parts of the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (the TNI or Indonesian military) had been 
involved in the rioting. Eventually, Habibie had to admit that even after instituting martial 
law, he was unable to control the mob.
151
 By mid September, the conditions had become so 
chaotic that President Habibie had to accommodate international pressure, announcing he 
would accept the result of the referendum as well as allow an international peacekeeping force 
to intervene in the country. On 12September Habibie said in a televised speech to the nation: 
"Too many people have lost their lives since the beginning of the unrest. We cannot wait any 
longer. We have to stop the suffering immediately."
152
  
The UN reacted promptly and three days after Habibie‘s speech, adopted Security Council 
Resolution 1264 calling for a multinational force to restore peace and security in East 
Timor.
153
 However, it had been clear from the beginning that the UN never did have the 
sufficient resources to combat the paramilitary forces directly. Therefore, with Resolution 
1264, the UN authorised the creation of the ‗International Force for East Timor‘ 
(INTERFET).  
4.5 Peace keeping and State building 
INTERFET was the UN-mandated multi-national force formed to protect Timorese civil 
society from violent harassment. It aimed to restore law and order and tried to provide a 
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secure environment for the work of the ‗United Nations Transitional Administration in East 
Timor‘ (UNTAET).154  
It was understood that the maintenance of the UN‘s work was essential to the process of East 
Timorese independence. A withdrawal of the UN agencies from the country would have been 
interpreted as a form of surrender undermining the seriousness of the ballot and the people‘s 
desire for self-determination.
155
 Over 20 nations contributed troops to the multinational 
INTERFET force, totalling about 10,000 personnel in total.
156
 Approximately half of the 
troops came from Australia, the remainder mostly from New Zealand and South-East Asian 
countries.
157
  
New Zealand‘s contribution was approved by all parties, except ACT which in parliament 
expressed serious concerns about the safety of NZ troops.
158
 In fact, the Labour-led opposition 
had been pressuring the National government to speed things up and deploy troops to East 
Timor as soon as possible. In contrast, the government preferred to wait for UN authorisation, 
and give Indonesia more time to resolve the issue on its own.
159
 However, NZ military forces 
had been alerted, and kept on standby ready to be deployed within 24 hours.
160
 Before they 
were eventually sent, all parties, including ACT which had opposed the deployment,, 
endorsed the mission.
161
  
The first INTERFET contingents landed in East Timor on 20 September 1999.
162
 The 
acceptance of the UN-authorised intervention by the Indonesian government – or at least its 
president as there were still many Indonesians sceptical about this decision – was an essential 
legal as well as psychological pillar for the mission. Without the Indonesian invitation there 
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would undoubtedly have been little support for INTERFET within Southeast Asia.
163
 The fact 
that INTERFET followed an official call for support played not only a significant role on the 
international level but also was an important reason for New Zealand‘s Green Party in their 
decision to support the mission.
164
  
On their arrival, INTERFET forces encountered minimal armed resistance. The appearance of 
several navy and air force contingents accompanied by thousands of international troops 
forced the Indonesian anti-independence militias to flee across the border into the western 
backcountry.
165
 However, there were sporadic cross-border raids during the following weeks, 
particularly around the southern border held by the New Zealand Army. During one of those 
skirmishes, a New Zealander, Leonard Manning, was killed in hostile fire and another three 
died in accidents.
166
 
INTERFET was not a blue helmet force and thus it was apparent from the mission‘s start that 
its deployment would be temporary until a United Nations peacekeeping operation could be 
approved, assembled and deployed to East Timor.
167
 INTERFET gave high priority to 
cooperation with UN agencies and non-governmental organisations‘ (NGOs) to establish 
humanitarian operations. Besides the fulfilment of their military duties, troops provided 
logistical assistance, protected aid stocks, and escorted aid convoys. After five months, on 
23
rd
 February 2000, INTERFET‘s mission was successfully completed and the military 
operations were handed over to UNTAET. At this stage East Timor was considered to be 
secure.
 168
 As a result, parts of INTERFET‘s military contingents were drawn off though the 
remaining troops had to face a short-term resurgence of West-Timorese military incursions.
169
 
UNTAET had been established to provide a temporary administration, exercising legislative 
and executive authority, as well as supporting the political build-up and development of the 
new East Timorese government. In the beginning UNTAET provided a legal authority for the 
Australian-led INTERFET troops, but after INTERFET had completed its fundamental goals 
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– particularly the restoration of law and order as well as the establishment of a secure 
environment and the development of a political infrastructure – the Australian Government 
transferred responsibility for East Timor back again to the UN. UNTAET‘s goal was to 
support and supervise East Timor‘s transition to full autonomy. This included the provision of 
security and the maintenance of law and order throughout the territory; the establishment of 
an effective administration; vital assistance in the development of civil and social services; the 
coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development 
assistance; the support of capacity-building for self-government; as well as assistance in 
establishing conditions for sustainable development.
170
 UNTAET mostly fulfilled those tasks 
and managed to assist the East Timorese progress towards independence by providing a 
relatively peaceful environment.
171
  
On 20 May 2002, UNTAET was eventually ended with all major functions handed over to the 
East Timorese government. East Timor finally became a fully recognised sovereign state. 
Command over the remaining multinational military and police forces, however, was not 
transferred to the government, but rather the newly created United Nations Mission of 
Support to East Timor (UNMISET).  
UNMISET basically continued the work of UNTAET with a smaller force of external military 
and police. Its task was to ensure the security and stability of Timor‘s growing state 
institutions. To this end, it was equipped with a mandate ―to provide assistance to core 
administrative structures critical to the viability and political stability of East Timor; to 
provide interim law enforcement and public Security and to assist in developing the ‗East 
Timor Police Service‘ (ETPS); and contribute to the maintenance of the new country's 
external and internal security.‖172 Under UNMISET‘s supervision, East Timor became a full 
member state of the United Nations on 27 September 2002.
173
 UNMISET‘s continuation had 
been designed as a short-term support agency for East Timor. The UN-Council determined 
that downsizing of UNMISET should proceed as fast as possible and that the mission should 
pass over all operational responsibilities to the East Timorese government over a period of 
two years. The mandate of UNMISET was completed in May 2005 and as another follow-up 
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agency, the ‗United Nations Office in Timor-Leste‘ (UNOTIL) was established on 20th May 
2005.
174
 
UNOTIL continued supporting the development of the Timorese institutional state by 
providing advisors for various political sectors. The agency was scheduled to end its mandate 
in May 2006. However, shortly before the end of its mission, a new political crisis arose in 
Dili. Mutinous parts of the military threatened the security of the East Timorese people, 
forcing the government of former opposition leader, and now president, Xanana Gusmao, to 
request police and military assistance from Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Portugal.
175
 
As a consequence, the UN Security Council prolonged UNOTIL‘s mandate and ultimately, in 
August 2006, another new agency was established: the ‗United Nations Integrated Mission in 
Timor-Leste‘ (UNMIT).176 
UNMIT was established to support the government and relevant institutions by consolidating 
stability, enhancing a culture of democratic governance and facilitating political dialogue; 
providing support to the national police and assist in conducting a comprehensive review of 
the role and needs of the security sector; assisting in further strengthening the national 
capacity for the monitoring, promotion and protection of human rights; cooperating and 
coordinating with United Nations agencies, funds and programmes and all relevant partners 
with a view to making maximum use of assistance in post-conflict peace-building and 
capacity-building. UNMIT persists in the country to this day.
177
  
4.6 New Zealand’s Influence  
Compared to Australia and other countries forced to be constantly vigilant in their national 
security needs, the unlikelihood of foreign powers occupying New Zealand gives the nation 
the luxury of entertaining cosmopolitan thinking in its foreign affairs.
178
 In general, it can be 
said that great powers in the international system, e.g. the US, and major regional powers, e.g. 
Australia, have a greater interest in supporting interventions as a result of their national 
interests in various parts of the world and their distinctive need for security. In contrast, 
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smaller states such as New Zealand, typically give primacy to the principle of non-
intervention as a way of keeping their sovereignty intact.
179
 New Zealand always 
acknowledged the principle of non-interference in other states‘ domestic affairs, although it 
has also given importance to human rights concerns.
180
 Nevertheless, in 1999 it was argued 
shortly after the start of INTERFET‘s Operation Warden that ―the idea that domestic issues 
are irrelevant to other states does not correspond to reality.‖181 Drug trafficking, illegal 
migration, arms smuggling, environmental pollution, and piracy were examples given for 
transnational issues which could have destabilising effects on single states, their neighbouring 
states or a whole region.
182
 Thus, it became increasingly accepted that on occasions the 
principle of non-interference sometimes had to be set aside in order to preserve a country‘s 
national interests. 
During East Timor‘s decolonisation phase in 1975, New Zealand showed a certain degree of 
sympathy for the Timorese desire for self-government. However, the fear that diplomatic 
relations with Indonesia could be damaged by publicly acknowledging East Timor‘s right to 
independence led to a refusal to recognise any Timorese political parties or individuals 
claiming to represent any form of Timorese government. When inter-party fighting broke out 
among the different Timorese interest groups, New Zealand remained neutral, suggesting 
Portugal would be the country most appropriate and most responsible to maintain peace and 
order in its former colony.
183
 However, Portugal‘s interest in the territory was limited, so the 
Timorese struggle continued. Unlike Australia, New Zealand did not encourage the 
Indonesian leader, Suharto, to intervene in the conflict; instead, New Zealand diplomats 
helped in drafting an UN resolution urging the global community to respect Timorese rights 
to freedom, independence and self-determination. However, when Suharto eventually invaded 
the province in late November 1975, New Zealand remained silent. On the one hand because 
NZ state officials had concerns about the actual possibility of Timorese self-determination, 
and on the other hand due to fear of damaging bilateral relations with Indonesia. Offending 
Indonesia was seen as potentially jeopardising regional stability. However, New Zealand – 
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again in contrast to Australia – never accepted the annexation de jure,184 though eventually de 
facto.
185
 
The fact that Australia and New Zealand, accompanied by the US, turned a blind eye to the 
Indonesian annexation of East Timor in 1975 was widely disapproved of in Oceania. 
Australia‘s and New Zealand‘s position helped to shape public opinion in favour of 
intervention when the 1999 crisis arose. Anthony Smith, who has served as an official 
observer to UNAMET, claimed that there would have been a public outcry in Australia and 
New Zealand if the governments had not supported the intervention in 1999. In his 
assessment, the general public in both countries felt that not enough had been done to support 
the East Timorese people since the annexation of the country by Indonesia in 1975.
186
 The 
Australian public even supported a proposal for a possible tax increase in case the military 
operation proved too costly and further funding became necessary.
187
  
According to a poll conducted shortly before the 1999 intervention took place, 82 per cent of 
New Zealanders disapproved of the Indonesian intervention in 1975. In contrast, over 60 per 
cent approved of New Zealand‘s response to the crisis and supported the deployment of NZ‘s 
troops in East Timor. 80 per cent supported the decision to be part of a UN peacekeeping 
mission.
188
 Consequently, the INTERFET-mission was widely endorsed by New Zealand 
politicians, strategic advisers, academics as well as the wider public. Keith Locke later 
claimed that the nation was united in favour of commitment to East Timor.
189
 
Green Party leader Jeanette Fitzsimons said in a parliamentary speech three days before the 
first INTERFET contingents landed in East Timor:  
The Green Party fully supports the decision to send New Zealand peacekeepers to 
East Timor and congratulates the United Nations Security Council on the prompt 
action it has taken, and the Prime Minister and the Government on being prepared 
to pick up on the invitation quickly. […]East Timor has never been internationally 
recognised as Indonesian territory except by a small handful of nations - ironically 
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this includes Australia which is now having to recognise that there was no basis for 
its previous position.190  
The fact that INTERFET was authorised by the UN was important for the Green Party to 
approve the mission. Fitzsimons pointed out that ―this is a force fully mandated by the United 
Nations, not an adventure by one or a few countries seeking their own geopolitical 
advantage.‖191  
According to a briefing paper for New Zealand members of parliament, the violence in East 
Timor had resulted in an estimated 400,000 refugees and nearly 1,000 East Timorese being 
killed in 1999.
192
 Those numbers were shocking, especially considering the East Timorese 
population only numbered one million people. Keith Locke, who went to East Timor shortly 
after the INTERFET mission, described the situation in the country as disastrous, with most 
houses being burned out and the roofs taken off, blaming the destruction on the Indonesian 
militants. He emphasised the point that ―every last East Timorese was demanding foreign 
intervention.‖193  
Subsequently, Locke demanded New Zealand cut all ties with the Indonesian military. In 
particular, he said Indonesian officers on a training course in New Zealand should be sent 
home immediately.
194
 He also argued for an abrupt ending of the bilateral ‗Mutual Assistance 
Programme‘ (MAP) and compared the Indonesian military to the forces of former Cambodian 
leader, Pol Pot.
195
 Locke stated the military should generally play a less central role in 
Indonesia to allow the development of a gradual democratisation of the country. He pressured 
the Labour-led government for three weeks on the issue, in the final stage claiming New 
Zealand had a moral duty to prevent its private companies carrying out work for Indonesians 
associated with the TNI.
196
 In retrospect, he believes that his course of action, combined with 
other actions taken by the international community, put pressure on the Indonesian 
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government and encouraged its openness towards a more democratic development in East 
Timor.
197
 
Jeanette Fitzsimons took a similar position, calling the government‘s collaboration with the 
Indonesian military disgraceful, and pointing out how former bilateral co-operation had 
contributed negatively to the current situation in East Timor.  
Our defence co-operation with Indonesia did not restrain the attacks of the 
Indonesian military against the Timorese people; it encouraged them. During 23 
years of brutal repression, New Zealand trained Indonesian military officers and 
serviced Indonesian military planes. Our links with Governments and armies in our 
region must in future be conditional on their human rights record.198 
Anthony Smith identifies three major forces that shaped New Zealand‘s decision to 
participate in the peacekeeping operation. First of all, since 1975 the UN refused – in contrast 
to New Zealand and Australia – to recognise Indonesia‘s rule over East Timor; based on the 
fact that Indonesia‘s invasion violated the internationally recognised boundary of newly 
decolonised East Timor. Second, there was evidence that there had always been strong 
resistance among the East Timorese people against the Indonesian occupation; expressed in 
frequent uprisings, but mainly visible in the overwhelming support for pro-independence 
parties during local elections and ultimately in the 1999 referendum. Third, a long list of 
human rights abuses and reoccurring crises in the region since the 1970s indicated that the 
province was developing into a lawless state.
199
  
Such arguments largely matched the Green Party‘s view of the conflict. Keith Locke criticised 
New Zealand‘s silence in regards to the occupation of East Timor in 1975, highlighting the 
fact that one New Zealander, a journalist named Gary Cunningham, lost his life when the 
Indonesian military invaded the province.
200
 Shortly before the ballot was held he had called 
for the opening of a Consulate in Dili to underline New Zealand‘s solidarity with the East 
Timorese population and their right to self-determination.
201
 When violence climaxed in 
September 1999 the Greens emphasised the overwhelming nature of the humanitarian and 
political crisis, saying that East Timor demonstrated, ―a clear cut case of upholding the 
unequivocal will of the people as expressed in a referendum with a turn-out that would be 
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remarkable in any peaceful democratic nation.‖202 Consequently, New Zealand‘s loyalty to 
the human rights declaration in the UN Charter and support for East Timor‘s right of self-
determination were eventually expressed through the country‘s significant military 
contribution to INTERFET. It was the country‘s largest commitment to a peacekeeping 
mission including over 800 military staff, a relatively large number by NZ standards.
203
 Until 
2002, New Zealand kept a 600-strong force in East Timor.
204
 On 15
th
 November 2002 most of 
the troops returned home. Only a few advisors stayed in the following years. In 2005 only six 
remained.
205
   
After the successful transformation of East Timor into an independent state, Britain, Australia 
and the US hurried to reactivate their military and defence relations with Jakarta. When the 
issue became apparent in New Zealand, Keith Locke criticised Defence Minister Phil Goff for 
allowing a ‗limited defence re-engagement‘ with Indonesia. Locke doubted that the TNI had 
undergone a successful reform process and reminded Goff on the mistakes New Zealand had 
made in 1975 by downplaying human rights violations to keep up good relations with 
Suharto. Furthermore he speculated ―that Indonesia was pressing the government strongly on 
this issue, and was probably backed by Australia, the US and Britain, who have all resumed 
defence relations with Jakarta.‖206 
4.7 The Aftermath: New Zealand’s Defence Reform 
The INTERFET mission demonstrated in which way New Zealand could possibly contribute 
to the resolution of future crises in its regional neighbourhood. It also showed weaknesses of 
the country‘s military body as it became apparent that New Zealand was not well equipped for 
the purpose of peacekeeping missions.  
In November 1999 newly elected Labour/ Alliance coalition-government under Helen Clark 
began quickly after the INTERFET mission to make significant cuts in the national defence 
budget. These defence reforms included the cancellation of a deal on 28 F-16 fighters, which 
had domestic as well as international political consequences. The deal had been approved by 
the former National government only four months before the election. For this reason it was 
heavily attacked by the Greens, who claimed that National was likely to lose the next election 
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anyway, and the F-16 purchase would just be ―another nail in the National government's 
coffin.‖207 Locke figured that the Greens would pressure the next government to cancel the 
deal again because there had been huge public opposition to it.
208
 Indeed a poll result 
televised on the 20
th
 March 2000 indicated that 68 per cent of New Zealanders supported the 
breaking of the contract.
209
 
Therefore, the Greens supported Clark in her reform plans after the election. ―There is no 
need to waste money on F16s […] [w]e must be more independent in our stance and not just 
follow Australia's lead. Australia is now learning that Canberra's support of Jakarta was a 
disaster.‖210 In a letter to the Prime Minister, the Greens pointed out that the purchase of F-16 
combat jets would be completely useless to a country like New Zealand, especially since 
Defence Minister Mark Burton had to admit that not even the old New Zealand Skyhawk jets 
were of much use to the country; in fact they had not been used once in 30 years.
211
  
Keith Locke pointed out that the ―F16 contract [would produce] a cost blow-out due to the 
cost-plus nature of the American foreign military sales system‖212 and the real costs could be 
expected to be as high as double that agreed on during negotiations on the contract in 1997. 
The United States was very much aware of the issue and offered to replace the Skyhawks with 
cut-price F-16s but as the defence reform was already underway, the Clark government 
rejected the offer.
213
 This was welcomed by the Greens as they noted that ―[t]he differences 
between our peacekeeping forces and our 'air strike force' are obvious. One gets used to keep 
international peace, the [other/ sic] has been used for nothing.‖214 According to Locke the 
only way New Zealand could somehow benefit from the 17 Skyhawks would be in selling 
them and investing the profit in equipment more suitable for peacekeeping missions.
215
 With 
                                                            
207 Keith Locke, Greens will push for Cancellation of F-16s (Press Release, 27th July 1999). Available at: 
http://www.greens.org.nz/press-releases/greens-will-push-cancellation-f-16s 
208 See: Ibid. 
209 See: New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (HANSARD), Vol. 582 (29 February to 30 March 2000), p.1220 
(21 March 2000). 
210 Fitzsimons, The East Timor Debate. 
211 See: Keith Locke, Cancel F-16s and sell Skyhawks (Press Release, 12th March 2000). Available at: 
http://www.greens.org.nz/press-releases/cancel-f-16s-and-sell-skyhawks 
212 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (HANSARD), Vol. 581 (20 December 1999 to 24 February 2000), p.756 
(24 February 2000). 
213 See: NZ Herald, After Skyhawk folly, let’s look closer to home (22nd September 2010). Available at: 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/opinion/news/article.cfm?c_id=466&objectid=10675183 
214 Keith Locke, Scrapping F-16s a good start (Press Release, 27th March 2000). Available at: 
http://www.greens.org.nz/press-releases/scrapping-f-16s-good-start 
215 See: Locke, Cancel F-16s and sell Skyhawks. Apparently this was tried for several years but the attempt failed 
at the end. See; NZ Herald, After Skyhawk folly, let’s look closer to home (22nd September 2010). Available at: 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/opinion/news/article.cfm?c_id=466&objectid=10675183 
46 
 
regards to the former peacekeeping mission in East Timor, Locke claimed New Zealand‘s 
peacekeeping equipment had been in a poor and ‗embarrassing‘ condition.216  
This was not a very popular approach among some New Zealand strategic commentators, one 
of whom argued:  
East Timor may represent a model for the future where smaller states, 
unencumbered with global responsibilities and the accompanying negative 
connotations, will take the lead in organising a coalition of the willing to respond 
to crises. The East Timor crisis illustrates that those states which assume the 
responsibility for leading humanitarian intervention will be expected by other 
contributors to provide the core of the combat force and its protection (including 
the deterrence of military threats).217  
 
Furthermore, it was claimed: ―If New Zealand decides to withdraw from providing sea and air 
combat contribution, Australia will be left alone to defend itself. At the heart of the F 16 issue 
is a decision. Does New Zealand want to help Australia?‖218  The Greens provided a very 
clear answer to that question even before it had been asked:  
We simply don't need to buy our way into anyone's good books, be it the US, 
Britain, Australia or any Asian nation, by purchasing unnecessary military 
hardware. […] We should get out of the Five Power Defence Arrangement, and 
drastically changing our relationship with Australia, as long as it has an outdated 
defence strategy, more related to a Cold War scenario, and subordinate to 
America's. Australia's defence treaty with Indonesia shows just how utterly wrong 
Australia's defence strategy can be. The Greens say that no longer should New 
Zealand be a subordinate power to the US, Australia or anyone else.219 
As was pointed out before, the reform process had indeed been seen in Australia as a 
downgrading of the nation‘s military capability and at the same time as a reduction of its 
commitment to its allies; particularly its trans-Tasman ally.
220
 Shortly after the reform was 
announced by the New Zealand government, the Australian Ministry of Defence published a 
Defence White Paper, which stated: ―We would regret any decision by New Zealand not to 
maintain at least some capable air and naval combat capabilities.‖221 Robert Patman described 
the Clark government‘s course of action as an almost unilateralist stance, which flew in the 
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face of close New Zealand-Australian economic and political ties. He also claimed there was 
―no electoral mandate for Labour‘s new defence policy and there was no real defence debate 
on the proposed changes prior to their implementation in 2001.‖222 
4.8 Conclusion 
The East Timor mission was widely regarded as a success. INTERFET reached its goals in 
terms of protecting the East Timorese from further assaults by the Indonesian militia, and 
restoring law and order. Stabilising and supporting the newly emerged government can also 
be interpreted as a triumph. The mission has thus been described in Australia as a ―by the 
book or model operation.‖223 New Zealand‘s Green Party, which supported the involvement 
from the very beginning, congratulated the returning defence forces on the successful 
completion of its East Timor mission: As Locke said at the time, "the Greens congratulate the 
thousands of New Zealanders who have contributed to peacekeeping in East Timor and are 
still doing so in other countries around the world."
224
  
The Greens support for New Zealand‘s role in INTERFET matched the party‘s values and 
requirements regarding foreign troop deployments. The mission was designed to bring relief 
to a humanitarian crisis; it was accepted by the host country; it was authorised and endorsed 
by the UN; and it was a peacekeeping operation rather than an involvement in a war. The 
mission not only removed hostile fighters, but was also characterised by continuous support 
for the build-up of a democratic state and government. While it might sound paradoxical, by 
supporting the use of force, the Green Party did its share in fighting for peace overseas. From 
today‘s perspective the East Timor mission is associated with some form of democratic 
development, especially in the early years when the United Nations guided and supported the 
local state building. Today the Greens have a more mixed view on the state of East Timor. 
They have expressed concerns about aspects of the operation, particularly the strong 
Australian influence on the military deployment, as well as the Australian influence on the 
newly installed East Timorese administration. Nevertheless, overall the Greens consider the 
operation to have been a success and would, under similar circumstances, support it again.
225
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As was mentioned above, the East Timor crisis redefined defence and security policies in 
Australia as well as New Zealand. The deployment revealed differences between Australia‘s 
and New Zealand‘s future defence approaches, rather than covering up the gaps in capability 
development and defence philosophy between the two countries. While the right-of-centre 
government in Canberra sought to pursue closer relations with Washington, and was therefore 
more open to the use of force, the newly elected left-of-centre government in New Zealand 
put more emphasis on internationally negotiated, rules-based approaches.
226
 The East Timor 
case represented an insight into the future roles of New Zealand in world affairs – and those 
had to be considered closer to peacekeeping than active combat. Therefore, an update of the 
country‘s military equipment more suitable for peacekeeping operations seemed to make 
sense and was welcomed by the Greens. This was reflected in the Labour-Alliance 
government‘s reluctance to invest in the F-16 jets – a decision that was strongly welcomed by 
the Green Party.  
Even as the Timor crisis was being resolved, new challenges were emerging. Australian 
defence and security analysts began worrying about the emergence of an ‗arc of instability‘, 
claiming that the region from Indonesia south-eastwards into the Pacific was mostly 
characterised by unstable governments coming close to the status of a failed state. The 
possible collapse of such governments was increasingly interpreted as a threat to Australia‘s 
national security
227
 a view that played an important role in the decision making process about 
another military intervention in the Solomon Islands three years later. 
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5 Solomon Islands 
In order to successfully explain the Green Party‘s perspective on the conflict in the Solomons 
and the reasons behind their support for New Zealand‘s contribution to a multinational 
intervention in the area, it is helpful to provide a brief historical overview on the development 
of the Solomon state and the factors that led to the crisis in 2003. 
5.1 History 
The Solomon Islands is an archipelago of over 1,000 islands between Papua New Guinea and 
Vanuatu. Its GDP per head lies somewhere around US$530, with fish, timber, gold and palm 
oil among its largest exports. However, as a result of continuous instabilities in the past two 
decades, many exports declined and its only significant export-good became timber.
228
 The 
Green Party claimed that the Solomons still has significant natural resources, though many of 
these are effectively under the control of foreign companies since the state had been pressured 
to sell off most of its assets during the Asian financial crisis of 1997. The Greens argued that 
this reallocation caused a lot of discomfort among the different ethnic groups on the 
Solomons and triggered violent eruptions from 1999 onwards.
229
 
The United Kingdom established a protectorate over the Solomon Islands in 1893. Since the 
beginning of colonial administration, the centralisation of power had been resisted at the local 
level and led frequently to ruptures between the population and the colonists.
230
 After ruling 
the islands for some sixty years, British order enforced the first Solomon constitution in 1960. 
During the following years the constitution was amended several times. In 1978, the 
Solomons finally became independent from Britain, though the Queen remained as its official 
head of state. In their attempt to get out of their colonies as fast as possible, the British 
government failed to provide an education system which would have enabled the local 
population to deal with the political changes.
231
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Nonetheless, the Solomon public and administration were expected to work from now on 
with, and under, an imposed Westminster system of government. The system was drafted in 
London and amended another three times throughout the 1980s.
232
 In general, many Solomon 
Islanders felt, and still feel, uneasy about the Westminster system. It has been widely 
interpreted as an imposition of western values on their Pacific state.
233
 Consequently, the 
history and political culture of the Solomons led to a form of regime which is often common 
and characteristic for the South Pacific region: A weak state with a strong leader. As a result, 
these states repeatedly suffer from corruption, lack of transparency, and instability. With the 
death of a leader often seen as the only possibility for change, military coups occur more 
frequently than compared to more powerful and wealthier countries.
234
  
The end of colonialism brought forth a generation of local island leaders characterised by 
nationalism, elitism and (local-) patriotism. Though ambitious, they lacked practical 
experience and could not rely on a well developed institutional infrastructure.
235
 Additionally, 
contact with western settlers in the past led to an influx of preventive medicine in the region, 
resulting in rapid population increase, leading to land shortage and growing poverty. 
Additionally, the GDP has halved since the country‘s independence in 1978.236 Such factors 
led unsurprisingly to feelings of unfairness and disaffection among the different ethnic groups 
in the Solomons, cumulating into frequent protests and riots in the nation‘s capitol, Honiara; 
e.g. in 1989, 1993, 1996 and 1998.
237
 
In 1999, hostilities between the two biggest ethnic groups – the people from Guadalcanal and 
the Malaitans – escalated into armed conflict and led to fatalities, refugees and an economic 
standstill; again mainly on the Solomon‘s central island of Honiara. Fighting between the 
groups centred on local influence, the division of land and control of natural resources. The 
militant ‗Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army‘ (GRA) started a violent campaign of harassment 
and intimidation against Malaitan settlers, leading to conflict erupting, including shootings 
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between GRA‘s and the ‗Royal Solomon Islands Police‘ (RSIP).238 After taking control over 
large parts of rural Guadalcanal, the capitol Honiara became some sort of enclave for the 
Malaitan population. Consequently, they formed an armed group as well: The ‗Malaita Eagle 
Force‘ (MEF). Both mobs clashed several times, and in June 2000, a de facto coup by the 
MEF forced Guadalcanalian Prime Minister, Bartholomew Ulufa‘alu, to resign from his 
duties. His previous requests for military assistance had been rejected by the ‗Pacific Island 
Forum‘ (PIF); in particular Australia and New Zealand, which had already been involved in 
East Timor since 1999.
239
 During a debate in parliament, Phil Goff stated: ―Clearly, New 
Zealand cannot solve the conflict for the Solomon Islands. Only they can do that for 
themselves.‖240 However, New Zealand provided some police forces and humanitarian aid to 
help the refugee problem resulting from the conflict.
241
 
After the coup, Ulufa‘alu was replaced by the opposition leader, Manasseh Sogavare, and 
under the influence of Australia and New Zealand, the ‗Townsville Peace Agreement‘ (TPA) 
brought a momentary end to the violent skirmishes in October 2000. However, the attempt to 
disarm the militants mostly failed; mainly because the disarmament process had been driven 
by the former militant groups themselves. Also the TPA failed to provide a sustainable 
framework for a subsequent peace process. Thus, it cannot be judged as a political success 
from current perspective.
242
  
In 2001, Allan Kemakeza, known to have close links to the MEF and having been described 
as ―one of the ‘embedded‘ Australian Officials‖243, was elected as the new Prime Minister. 
But he and his party, the ‗People‘s Alliance Party‘ (PAP), did not live up to expectations and 
did not succeed in resolving local problems; e.g. the distribution of land. The RSIP was part 
of the problem, because many personnel were also members of criminal gangs and had close 
contacts with remaining militant groups. Additionally some PAP politicians were accused of 
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corruption. All this culminated in the imminent and apparently inevitable economic downfall 
of state and local businesses.
244
  
In October 2002, the TPA itself came to an end and tension between the different islander 
groups slowly increased again. By 2003, the conflict was so intense that Australia, New 
Zealand, and cooperating states from the PIF formed the ‗Regional Assistance Mission to the 
Solomon Islands‘ (RAMSI) to assist the struggling government. Planning of a possible 
deployment of New Zealand forces to the Solomons by the MFAT started from May 2003 
onwards.
245
 However, small numbers of New Zealand police forces had already been 
deployed to the Solomons around that time. This deployment gained the consent of the Green 
Party: ―The Green Party supports our police going to help the Solomon Islands people to help 
them move to a situation where the rule of law applies. […] I understand that about 10 New 
Zealand police are there now, and this will expand to perhaps 30 or 40 under the 
arrangements.‖246 Two months later, on 24th July 2003, the multilateral forces under 
Australian leadership intervened on Kemakeza‘s invitation. The intervening force was mainly 
a police mission, backed up by a strong military contingent. All together, over 2000 personnel 
were deployed.
247
 In a relatively short period of time, nearly 4000 weapons were confiscated 
and law and order had been restored on the main island Guadalcanal.  
5.2 RAMSI 
The RAMSI operation was called Helpem Fren (Help a Friend) because it has been a response 
to a call for assistance from an associate government. The action is considered to be the 
largest military operation in the South Pacific since World War II.
248
 The most important 
goals were defined as restoring law and order in the Solomon‘s capitol of Honiara, and 
supporting the organisation of effective state machinery to get a reform process started. The 
mission was never designed to establish a new form of government in the Solomons. It only 
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sought to ensure a secure environment for the community to debate pressing national 
issues.
249
  
While the Greens opposed New Zealand‘s troop deployments to Afghanistan, they supported 
and approved the commitment to the Solomons before its commencement:  
―The Green Party supports our police going to help the Solomon Islands people to 
help them move to a situation where the rule of law applies. […] The critical 
element in determining how we see such an operation is what the people of the 
country itself want. So far it seems that the people of the Solomon Islands, from the 
Prime Minister Sir Alan Kemakeza down, want a contribution of this sort.‖250 
 Keith Locke also highlighted the fact that the Green Parties of New Zealand and Australia 
had a similar point of view on the mission:  
―The New Zealand Greens will be supporting this peacekeeping force, as will our 
colleagues the Australian Greens on other side of the Tasman. We are very pleased 
that they are putting their support behind this, because it is something that the 
Greens as a whole, internationally, put forward, that we should really concentrate 
on peacemaking, trying to bring parties together, and trying to resolve the 
situations in other countries in as peaceful a manner as possible but backed up with 
policing and peacekeeping forces, where required.‖251  
He also found a clever way to secure the troop contingent required for the Solomon mission 
by suggesting that the SAS troops in Afghanistan should not be sent back in their next 
rotation. Thereby, manpower and financial resources could be redirected for the RAMSI 
contribution instead.
252
 
5.3 Reasons and Justification 
New Zealanders widely accepted that their state had a responsibility to reply to the Solomon‘s 
request for assistance. There was growing public concern over the possible collapse of a 
democratic government in the neighbouring region, concerns about the possibility of 
transnational crime, the possibility of the instability spreading to other island nations, and the 
general belief that New Zealand has certain responsibilities and obligations in the region.
253
 
Another often used justification for state intervention, however, was the threat of terrorism. 
After the 9/11 attacks in the United States, the phrase became one of the most frequently used 
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terms in the Asia-Pacific security discourse.
254
 The Solomons were reported in 2003 by an 
influential Australian think-tank – the ‗Australia Strategic Policy Institute‘ (ASPI) – as a 
`failing state` which could become a haven for terrorists.
255
  
It became clear during the late 1990s and early 2000s that petty criminal and drug networks 
were operating more or less unchallenged within the region. Some Island states, including 
Nauru, Niue, and the Cook Islands had, in addition, been linked to passport sales and money 
laundering by the United States. Apparently, this benefited international terrorism and the 
countries named were pressured to reform their banking regulations to undermine the dubious 
activities of various offshore banks operating in the Pacific Island states.
256
 According to US 
officials there was also the issue of human trafficking, transporting thousands of illegal 
immigrants from China to New Zealand and Australia through the South Pacific route. Even 
more worrying was the uncontrolled arms trade in the region, particularly the trade of small 
arms and light weapons. This was no surprise considering that they were often sold from local 
police and military stockpiles to militant gangs.
257
  
This issue, however, was not unknown and had already been addressed by Green MP Keith 
Locke in early 2003. Marian Hobbs, the former Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control, 
replied to Keith‘s parliamentary request in regards to reported arms trade in the South Pacific, 
that New Zealand would provide assistance to the police forces in the Solomon Islands, 
Vanuatu, Cook Islands and Tonga for several years, helping them to improve the security, 
storage, maintenance and management of their weapons.
258
 Still, during the RAMSI mission 
in 2003, more than 3,700 weapons were found and confiscated in the Solomons alone.
259
  
Nonetheless the South Pacific region was rated as an area where terrorist attacks were 
unlikely and housing or supporting of terrorists was of little concern.
260
 Its geographic 
remoteness and small populations of close-knit communities made the South Pacific a 
generally difficult area for terrorists to operate inconspicuously.
261
 Dennis Blair, the former 
Chief of the US Pacific Command, gave the region a low rating for terrorist threats in 2002, 
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and former Cook Island Prime Minister, Geoffrey Henry, commented that terrorism was of 
little relevance to Pacific Islanders. They were more concerned with their economic and 
environmental security.
262
  
So, a lot of the terrorism accusations were proven false. Small and unstable states like the 
Solomon Islands could barely provide the level of coherence required by genuinely rogue 
states and international terrorist networks.
263
 However, the questionable banking and 
immigration policies of some island states presented opportunities for the possible movement 
of funds or persons associated with terrorist groups.
264
 Consequently, in 2003, the New 
Zealand and Australian government‘s motivation to intervene in the conflict was also driven 
by ―the fear that the Solomons, as a `failed state`, could eventually become a host to 
international terrorist groups.‖265 Or as Phil Goff explained it: ―That is terrorism in our 
backyard.‖266 
Shortly after RAMSI had taken place Keith Locke criticised the Australian-headed 
justification, saying the driving force for the mission was more an example of Australia acting 
on a basis of self-interest, than helping a smaller neighbouring state:  
―Under John Howard the Australian Government has made all sorts of strange 
statements about the reasons that it is going to the Solomons - that is, it is about 
combating international terrorism, gun running, drug-smuggling, and these sorts of 
things that we do not really see in the Solomons. A lot of the stuff the Australian 
Government talks about is just mythical, but it sort of fits its world view at the 
present time that there is a terrorist under every bed and we have to have military 
forces, police, new security laws, and everything else.‖267 
5.4 International Cooperation 
The Solomon Islands mission has been compared several times to the United Nations Mission 
in support of East Timor after the country‘s independence. However, in the case of the 
Solomons, the United Nations Security Council did not become involved, because the 
Solomon Islands maintained diplomatic recognition of Taiwan, and a Chinese veto in the 
                                                            
262 See: John Henderson, ‗―New‖ Security in Oceania‘, in: Engaging Oceania with the Pacific, edited by Peter 
Cozens (Centre for Strategic Studies, Wellington, 2004), pp.31-42, p.35. 
263 See: Fraenkel, ‗South-West Pacific: Arc of Instability or Matrix of Discontent?‘, p.123. 
264 See: Hoadley, Pacific Island Security Management by New Zealand & Australia, p.3.  
265 Suter, ‗New Zealand‘s Role in the Pacific: The New Warfare State‘, p.92. 
266 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (HANSARD), Vol. 609 ( 10 June to 1 July 2003), p.6696 (1 July 2003). 
267 Keith Locke, Crimes and Misconduct (Overseas Operations) Bill (Speech, 5th August 2005). Available at:  
http://www.greens.org.nz/speeches/crimes-and-misconduct-overseas-operations-bill 
56 
 
committee against the operation was expected.
268
 Although the president of the Security 
Council endorsed the mission in a press statement and highlighted the importance of 
Australia‘s, as well as New Zealand‘s, leadership role within the mission, the action was not 
backed officially by a Security Council resolution.
269
  In general, the use of force without a 
Security Council resolution is banned in international law except in cases of self-defence (e.g. 
as the United States had claimed for their  involvement in Afghanistan two years before). 
However, permission had been given for cases where regional organisations decided that 
certain situations had to be addressed with urgency.
270
  
The importance of UN mandates is widely acknowledged, but commentators in Australia and 
New Zealand claimed that the countries should keep the option of regional coalitions open, to 
react and assist in a diplomatic or militarily- appropriate way in case of spontaneous uprising 
crises in their neighbourhood.
271
 Thus, in the case of RAMSI, international legitimacy had to 
be provided through another international or regional agency apart from the UN – this was the 
Pacific Island Forum. 
The PIF is a regional multilateral institution and represents the main regional political body in 
the South Pacific. It has 16 sovereign and independent member states from the Pacific, 
including New Zealand and Australia.
272
 The organisation was founded in 1971 in Wellington 
under the name, ‗South Pacific Forum‘ (SPF). Based on their relative size and resources, 
Australia and New Zealand wield great influence within the Forum‘s decision making 
process.
273
 Today, its mission is  
―to ensure the effective implementation of the Leaders‘ decisions for the benefit of 
the people of the Pacific. [The organisation‘s goals] are to stimulate economic 
growth and enhance political governance and security for the region, through the 
provision of policy advice; and to strengthen regional cooperation and integration 
through coordinating, monitoring and evaluating implementation of Leaders‘ 
decisions.‖274 
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Regional co-operation in regards to trade, marketing, environment, fishery, education, and 
regional shipping, as well as the improvement of relations with international organisations 
such as the Commonwealth, ASEAN, or UN agencies, were the primary driving force for the 
PIF‘s founding and development. One of the founding rules was the principle of non-
interference in the internal affairs of sovereign member states. In 1975, Tonga broached the 
issue of regional security for the first time within the Forum. During the following years, 
other Pacific states, e.g. Fiji and the Solomon Islands, addressed the issue, but the Forum 
stuck to its principle of non-interference and rejected all calls for assistance. After several 
crises in the region had demonstrated the need for an upgrade of the status quo, the Biketawa 
Declaration was adopted at a PIF-meeting in 2000. While still upholding the principle of non-
interference in general, the need and duty for assistance in times of crisis or conflict were 
officially recognised by the PIF. From this time on, a member state‘s request for assistance 
could also be answered by the PIF with an authorisation of a concerted use of force. Thus, the 
PIF changed its perspective on internal affairs, acknowledging that certain circumstances 
might become a legitimate concern for the Forum as a whole, transforming it into a helpful 
vehicle for conflict prevention.  
By requesting the PIF‘s assistance in the following year, the Kemakeza-led government of the 
Solomon Islands was the first regime that made use of this option.
275
 All 16 member states 
unanimously accepted the Solomon‘s request and agreed ―to support in principle and, where it 
could, in practice, the needs of the Solomon Islands.‖276 The PIF-mandate for RAMSI, as well 
as the fact that the Solomon‘s government asked for the mission, provided international 
legitimacy for the case. For the Greens, this was an important fact behind their support for the 
mission: ―It is good that the Pacific Island leaders […] endorse this operation. I hope that they 
will make a contribution, because […] it is good if other Pacific Island countries are involved 
alongside Australia and New Zealand.‖277  
However, in strong contrast to a UN-mandate, the multilateral agreement between the 
contributing Pacific nations did not specify a time limit for the mission.
278
 Former NZ Foreign 
Minister Phil Goff stated two years after the start of RAMSI in 2005: ―While security in the 
Solomons has been restored, peace remains fragile. […] New Zealand can expect to make 
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more contributions like those in Afghanistan and the Solomons, as we‘re working to keep the 
peace and improve people‘s lives. […] This level of activity is likely to continue.‖279 As New 
Zealand remains involved in various areas of conflict in different parts of the world, his 
statement proved prescient.  
5.5 New Zealand’s Interest in the South Pacific 
New Zealand has generally been seen as closer to the South Pacific, while Australia usually 
concerned itself more with Asia. However, at the end of the 1990s, their spheres of interest 
geographically crossed when New Zealand started to intervene in the Bougainville conflict as 
well as in East Timor, while Australia became heavily engaged in the Solomon Islands in 
2003.
280
 New Zealand‘s and Australian interests in the South Pacific had already overlapped 
significantly since the late 1990s, and their political approaches in the region had been marked 
by strong consensus and many complementarities. Chris Seed proposed: ―Indeed, the efforts 
of the two countries in recent times have only intensified, with a strong focus on results and 
outcomes, rather than tactical differences over means and methods (although the very nature 
of the issues means differences will always exist and need management).‖281 Though New 
Zealand and Australian interests in the Pacific may overlap, they are not necessarily identical.  
Traditionally, New Zealand‘s main interest in its neighbourhood has been keeping hostile 
powers out of the area. These days, the country has also taken on a responsibility to safeguard 
the region.
282
 Consequently, New Zealand‘s involvement in the challenges of the Pacific 
region include a wide range of state actors from defence, foreign affairs and trade, aid as well 
as local police and custom sectors.
283
 The government‘s view on the Pacific region also 
recognises evidential links between poverty and conflict. Rather than treating the symptoms 
of violence or civil war, New Zealand tries to address the root causes of crises by increasing 
its aid donations. Wellington wants to be known for its promotion of effective governments, 
democratic elections and the installation of effective civil services and state institutions.
284
 
However, in the case of the Solomon Islands conflict, the Green Party attacked the 
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government on the aid issue, claiming the NZ$8 million funds annually given in the past to 
the Solomons had been far from being sufficient and should therefore be doubled.
285
 
When it comes to the RAMSI decision-making process, New Zealand is obliged to follow 
Australia. This is no surprise as it seems to be in the nature of the traditional relationship 
between the two states. In New Zealand, ―defence has never had the same importance as it has 
had in neighbouring Australia; this has been attributed to New Zealand‘s greater remoteness 
from the presumed source of threats, Asia, and the fact that it is shielded by a well-armed ally, 
Australia.‖286 Keith Locke commented on this relationship as follows: ―For most in our 
history in defence, we‘ve been dancing to someone else‘s tune: Firstly the British, and in 
recent decades the Americans and the Australians.‖287 However, it is actually to acknowledge 
that Canberra has political and military resources available which neither New Zealand nor 
any other RAMSI partner state can match.
288
 Australia contributed around A$200 million in 
the first year while New Zealand, as the second biggest contributor, paid some NZ$16 
million.
289
 The value of New Zealand‘s involvement totalled NZ$22.73 million in 2003-04, 
NZ$9.15 million in 2004-05, NZ$11.39 million in 2005-06, and NZ$12.94 million in 2007-
08.
290
 These numbers can indeed be interpreted as an indicator of NZ‘s weight in the decision 
making process within RAMSI.  
Compared to Australia, New Zealand has a few advantages in its international relations with 
South Pacific Island states. It has stronger cultural connections because of its larger 
Polynesian and Maori population maintaining strong links with the Pacific Community. New 
Zealand‘s Pacific people can travel home with ease and are thereby able to maintain strong 
family connections. In the case of some Pacific nations like Niue, the Cook Islands or Samoa, 
the majority of the population already lives in New Zealand. Also, a large number of Pacific 
people in key administrative positions in their homeland have close affiliations with New 
Zealand as a result of education, sports or exchange programs. The communities in New 
Zealand as well as in their homelands generally hold New Zealand‘s democratic and civic 
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traditions in high regard. They also recognise that political stability is important to the 
economic growth of their home countries.
291
 There is clear evidence that Pacific Islander 
RAMSI personnel who understand and respect the local culture are more effective in 
communicating with the residents.
292
 
Besides those cultural connections, New Zealand seems in general less threatening to the 
Pacific Island states because of its small size as well as its political distance from Asia, which 
is seen as putting pressure on the region from the north. The New Zealand approach of a more 
relaxed diplomatic style is widely recognised in the South Pacific. If Canberra behaves more 
like a bully than a big brother, then Wellington‘s less assertive approach will probably be 
welcomed by most island states. However, this image of a special relationship might fade if 
New Zealand does not retain its own foreign policy. Giving the impression of being an 
extension of Australian foreign policy is not necessarily beneficial to the country‘s position in 
the region.
293
 Thus, Wellington claims not to share a universal strategic unit with Canberra.  
5.6 New Zealand’s Influence on RAMSI 
In 2003, New Zealand opted for a softer approach, and Australia‘s decision to put over 2,000 
heavily armed soldiers in the Solomons raised serious concerns in New Zealand. National MP 
and opposition leader Bill English questioned the Government‘s real intention behind the 
intervention, pointing out that the mission was declared as a police mission, but included a far 
higher number of armed military troops than police officers.
294
 The Greens, who, like the 
National Party, generally supported the intervention, also criticised the size of the force. They 
compared the incident to New Zealand‘s involvement in East Timor and pointed out the 
differences between the two cases. While the Solomons were shaken by riots of local groups, 
the militias in East Timor received organised backing from West Timor militias. For that 
reason, a stronger military back-up was required for the INTERFET-mission.
295
Shortly before 
the RAMSI-deployment, Keith Locke expressed his concerns in parliament:  
―I am not sure whether we need 2,000 military people in this force. I think we have 
to be concerned that we can have too much overkill, in terms of military 
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intervention. […] we do have to be careful that problems can develop, if we do not 
handle the situation sensitively, or there is a bit of overkill in our response, that we 
can draw hostility from the local population, which can make the situation 
worse.‖296  
In fact, those concerns were met by the Labour government. It was uneasy about being seen to 
intervene like a big brother in the affairs of a smaller neighbour state. Thus, New Zealand 
agreed to send police and logistics personnel, but initially declined to send military troops and 
instead offered to keep an infantry group on standby. However, when the Australian 
government demanded those infantries a month later, they were sent immediately.
297
 All 
together, New Zealand contributed nearly 300 military personnel and police officers to the 
operation,
298
 and by doing so, it demonstrated its willingness to follow a ―growing regional 
approach to building security within Island states‖299 in the future. The deployment had the 
support of all parties represented in parliament. ―Not a single party has said that this 
deployment should not take place.‖300 
The roles of the New Zealand police and military contingents within RAMSI were severely 
circumscribed. The primary task for both groups was to restore law and order. The police 
forces were in addition, obliged to rebuild trust in public safety and law-enforcement among 
the islanders. They had to protect selected key Solomon Island government staff and arrest the 
Guadalcanalian Leader Harold Keke and his followers. RAMSI police forces were also 
responsible for the collection and disposal of turned-in weapons and firearms. Another task 
was the establishment, training and support of a new indigenous police force.  
The military personnel were mainly present to protect the police forces during their work and 
provide an environment in which economic, administrative and social reforms could occur 
unhindered.
301
 At present, RAMSI personnel are still stationed in the Solomons, but have 
been significantly reduced by nearly 75 per cent. However, New Zealand temporarily 
strengthens its troop contingent from time to time when big political events are on the 
Solomon agenda.
302
 Currently, in 2010, there are 35 New Zealand Police personnel and 43 
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NZDF troops deployed to the Solomon Islands. A number of New Zealand civilian personnel, 
including the Deputy Special Coordinator, are also serving with the mission.
303
   
5.7 Australian Influence on RAMSI 
Australia‘s interest in the South Pacific region was relatively weak until the terror bombing in 
Bali occurred in October 2002. More than 200 people, including 88 Australians, died.
304
 The 
bombing has been described as ―Oceania‘s 9/11‖305 because it led Australia, and to a lesser 
extent, New Zealand, to re-think their positions and political approaches towards upcoming 
challenges in their ‗backyard‘.306 Terrence O‘Brien stated that the 2003 intervention in the 
Solomons ―was in fact the product of a sudden reversal of earlier Australian disinterest.‖307 
After the Bali bombing, Australia promptly took over the leading position in RAMSI and 
directed the size and style of the intervention forces. The general Australian view on the 
South Pacific had drastically changed: the ‗hands-off‘ approach was replaced by a ‗get tough‘ 
attitude, resulting in a more proactive role in the region.
308
 Elsina Wainwright defined three 
major driving forces behind Australia‘s decision to intervene in the Solomons:  
Firstly was the fear of a terrorist threat. A weak government with a poor security 
infrastructure close to Australian shores was seen as a possible base for transnational criminal 
operations threatening Australian national security. Second was the strategic dimension, as the 
Solomons were nearly bankrupt and thus an easy target for foreign powers to gain significant 
influence in the region. Through its forceful engagement, Australia made sure that no other 
state or non-state actor with potentially contrary interests to Canberra could break into the 
contemporary vacuum of power. As the third point, Wainwright identified Australia‘s concern 
about the possible spread of instability affecting the whole region.
309
 This view was widely 
echoed in the Australian media – newspapers published catchy headlines like: ―Melanesia is 
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on fire and one day the flames will engulf Australia.‖310 Clive Moore highlighted in 2004 
RAMSI‘s role in preserving the Solomons from falling into ―near anarchy‖311.  
Wainwright stated that if Australia had not assisted in such a crisis, no one would have.
312
 
This might be true to a certain extent, but Australia‘s dominance within RAMSI also received 
widespread criticism: Iris Wielders declared RAMSI had essentially become a ―whole-of-
government approach directed from Australia.‖313 The multilateral agreement specified since 
the start that key positions within the future administrative body of the Solomons would have 
to be assigned by Australia. In return, Canberra provided the mission with large numbers of 
civilian, police and military staff. Keith Locke expressed concern about Australia‘s influence 
on the mission: ―I have heard reports from Australia of putting different Australians in the 
different ministries for the long term. I think we have to be a bit wary about being seen to be 
dominating.‖314 In August 2003 when the mission was in full swing, he elaborated his point in 
parliament:  
―One concern I have in the Australia-New Zealand commitment, […] is that I am a 
bit worried that we could get our balance wrong. A number of Australians and New 
Zealanders as part of this operation will go into ministries like the Solomons 
Treasury. […] if Australians and New Zealanders go into these jobs in the Treasury 
and other Government departments then start to determine the economic policy of 
the country and perhaps apply the Howard approach of much more deregulation, 
privatisation, and all of those sorts of things, it would not be in the long-term 
interests of the Solomon Islands people.‖315 
 
Southern Californian Historian Judith Bennett claimed that by intervening in the Solomons, 
Australia had simply protected its strategic interests. She therefore interpreted RAMSI as a 
pre-emptive strike and linked the mission‘s urgency to Australia‘s alliance with the US.316 
She criticised the intervention in clear language: ―It was Australia‘s intervention, not some 
concerted regional decision. The Pacific Islands Forum, which had failed to come up with a 
better solution, endorsed it.‖317 Australian domination of RAMSI has also been criticised in 
the Solomon Islands themselves. John Roughan, editor of the NZ Herald, argued that 
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―RAMSI is a Canberra run operation with little or no input from the Pacific Forum‘s 
Secretary General.‖318  
5.8 Beyond RAMSI 
RAMSI is widely seen as being successful; at least in the short term. Clive Moore reviewed 
the decision to send a regional mission, rather than waiting for a UN-decision, as appropriate, 
enabling a quick response to the Solomon‘s plea for assistance.319 After being deployed in the 
country for only three months, the military started to be scaled back from October 2003. By 
December 2003, over half of the military contingent had been withdrawn, followed by other 
personnel in spring 2004.
320
 The operation has been portrayed as short, effective and 
bloodless. Over 3,500 illegal firearms were collected. RAMSI was presented to the public as 
an action from good neighbours to a good friend.
321
 The mission incorporated elements of a 
peacekeeping operation in its police and military deployment, but in the long term technical 
assistance played a larger role in helping to strengthen the Solomon‘s political body and state 
institutions. This approach of RAMSI can be seen as a general shift from peace-building to 
state-building.
322
   
The rapid success of restoring law and order to the Solomons seemed to prove that the 
Australian approach was right, and could set a new role model for future RAMSI 
interventions. However, in the long term the situation in the Solomons remains problematic. 
Wainwright claimed that while RAMSI was still in full action, the mission would be 
composed of two phases. Firstly the short-term restoration of law and order followed by a 
long-term commitment to the establishment of a robust and working political system.
323
 
Moore estimated in 2004 that the complete transformation of the state towards a stable 
sovereign system could take more than ten years. Local discomfort with the constant presence 
of RAMSI forces has thus been predictable.
324
 In 2007 he argued, however, that the 
indigenous systems of power and authority were still not aligned with modern liberal 
democratic governance structures. Because of this lack of reform, he feared the Solomon 
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Islands could fall back into violence and argued therefore for the continuation of troop 
deployment.
325
  
Shortly after the successful troop deployment, Australia‘s Prime Minister John Howard 
announced there might be a need for further Australian-led interventions in other Island states 
suffering from corruption and lawlessness.
326
 Australian think tanks frequently hypothesized 
since the beginning of the mission ―that there can be ‗no exit strategy‘ as far as the 
neighbourhood is concerned.‖327 If political turmoil continued to destabilise the region, it was 
likely that future operations had to be carried out. Recently, Papua New Guinea‘s Prime 
Minister, Sir Michael Somare, while struggling with the opposition, suggested RAMSI 
assistance could prevent the country from falling into a lawless state of disorder.
328
 
New Zealand‘s Greens already expressed their worries about such an outcome before the start 
of RAMSI. Keith Locke stated in early July 2003: ―I am a bit concerned about some of the 
Australian Government comments that almost determine in advance that this will be an 
operation that will last for years, when the aim should obviously be to help through this 
process, and boost the confidence and ability of the Solomon Islands people to get their own 
society on track. Our aim, as it should be, is an operation in the shortest possible time 
frame.‖329 
 
5.9 Competing Systems of Governance 
Disarming military groups and restoring law and order are difficult tasks on their own. 
Rebuilding economic and social infrastructure is even more difficult.
330
 ―Addressing the 
threat to regional security requires more than simply bringing an end to violence;‖331 it also 
demands vital support for the political rebuilding of the Solomon Islands. Trying to change 
the people‘s understanding of their local political culture and convincing them of the 
advantages of Western-style democracy will take generations. And this last goal can only be 
reached through education, not through the use of force. 
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RAMSI‘s cooperative nature created a dilemma. RAMSI depended, particularly in its first 
years – but through to the present – on co-operation with the political elite in Solomon 
Islands. However, many of the high-ranking officials had been involved in corruption and 
intimidation in the past and RAMSI‘s judicial limitation within its mandate prevented them 
from being prosecuted.
332
 Government officials and state institutions were thus generally 
mistrusted by large numbers of the Solomon population.
333
 
Currently there are two systems of government operating in the Solomon Islands – the 
customary system, and the national parliamentary democracy introduced during the 
protectorate era. The customary system had existed in some form since the country was first 
populated and continues to be practiced at a local level, particularly in rural areas. It is mainly 
characterised by a big man, or chief, who represents his community and their interests. Access 
to this leader is relatively easy, even for the lowliest citizen. Family connections are important 
and what New Zealanders and Australians would commonly consider low level corruption is 
commonly practised and culturally accepted.
334
 
In contrast to the customary system, the national government is represented by the Prime 
Minister and a Governor General chosen by parliament. The Governor General represents the 
Crown of England which remains the official head of state, and an easy target for local critics. 
It is unlikely that a totally rules-based administrative system ignoring local political cultures 
can be implemented in the Solomons.
335
 Interest groups in the Solomon‘s remain diverse and 
the division of resources between national and local government continues to be an 
underlying cause of calls for reform or conflict.
336
  
Although RAMSI was never intended to replace the government, its role lies somewhere 
between these two systems. Its primary task was to support the government in becoming 
operational again. The organisation, officially represented through the PIF, has its own vision 
of reform and remains in the country to stabilise the political and administrative infrastructure 
of the state. Human resource development and a sustainable economic growth have to be in 
place and working before all RAMSI staff can depart again.
337
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5.10 Criticism 
Shortly after the RAMSI mission had begun, the Greens started criticising New Zealand‘s 
efforts in re-building the local political system:  
―For instance the New Zealand government approach — which is, unfortunately, a 
bit different from the Green approach — is towards deregulation, privatisation, and 
things like that, which might not necessarily apply most effectively in the Solomon 
Islands. […] I will be interested to get […] an assessment of whether the traditions 
of the Solomon Islands, and whether the possibility of utilising their traditions, 
their tribal structures etc., was fully taken account of in helping to rebuild Solomon 
Islands society.‖338 
Kennedy Graham argued the regional presence of two metropolitan states, Australia and New 
Zealand, operating within, rather than supporting regional structures, complicated matters 
more than benefiting them. And Jon Fraenkel warned that if foreign powers would try too 
hard to develop suitable constitutions and nurture responsible leaders, the Solomons would be 
transported back into a new form of colonialism.
339
 This dilemma is also known as 
constitutional colonialism. The imperial powers left behind an elaborate national constitution 
which was not very applicable to the local political culture of the region. Trying to bypass this 
lack of applicability by placing as many non-Solomons as possible in key political and 
economic positions was not a promising strategy in the long term.  
With regards to economic recovery and aid, questions had also been raised about the fact that 
a significant percentage of Australian funds allocated to the Solomon Islands were actually 
spent in Australia or to the benefit of Australians. The key positions under RAMSI were 
mainly filled with Australians, meaning the money earned was essentially going back to 
Australia instead of staying in the Solomons and helping them to recover economically and 
socially. Resources had been wasted while at the same time local cultural traditions were 
disdained. The Solomon Islands were seen as a training ground for Australian advisors, taking 
away Solomon Islanders' chances to participate in the political shaping of their country.
340
 In 
2006, newly elected Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare expressed his concern about the 
heavy involvement of Australians within the Solomon administration: ―Australia seemed to 
have used the provisions of the current partnership as a licence to infiltrate almost all sectors 
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of the public sector.‖341 In addition, Solomon generals and their advisors expressed their fear 
the country could even lose its national sovereignty.
342
 
5.11 The Immunity Issue 
RAMSI has been criticised for demanding from the Solomon Islands its personnel immunity 
from Solomon law.
343
 In case RAMSI members committed crimes while on duty, the 
immunity protected them from prosecution under local law. The Government of the Solomon 
Islands signed on the 24
th
 July – the day RAMSI arrived – a law which provided all visiting 
forces with full immunity.
344
 The Facilitation of International Assistance Act states that  
―members of the visiting contingent, the assisting country, and other countries 
whose personnel are members of the visiting contingent, shall have immunity from 
legal proceedings in Solomon Island courts or tribunals in relation to actions of the 
visiting contingent or its members that are taken in the course of, or are incidental 
to, official duties.‖345 
In reference to that law, New Zealand‘s parliament started debating the so called Crimes and 
Misconduct (Overseas Operations) Bill; essentially this was a reform of its national Crimes 
Act from 1961. In summary, the bill made New Zealanders deployed overseas accountable for 
their actions while on duty. The bill made every kind of behaviour that would have broken 
New Zealand laws illegal, even when the crime had been conducted in another country. 
However, the law also prevented NZ personnel from being prosecuted and possibly 
imprisoned in the host country, and instead prescribed extradition of the accused back to New 
Zealand where he or she could be judged.
346
 The Greens argued strongly in favour of the new 
bill‘s conception and highlighted that the bill‘s application would be only a temporary 
measure until a functional legal body could be established in the Solomons. Keith Locke 
postulated:  
―[The bill] will help to make sure that the people who go over there - the police and 
other civilians as part of the Government commitment there - abide by law. There 
is not a very functioning legal process in the Solomons at the present time, so it is 
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appropriate in negotiation with the Solomon Islands authorities to have this 
application of New Zealand law to the people serving over there.‖347 
He also made clear that the bill would exclude military personnel as the military operated 
under its own laws, and also it should exclude members of non-governmental organisations 
―because we would move into quite a grey area if we say that non-governmental organisations 
separate from the Government are covered by New Zealand law in the way this bill 
proposes.‖348  
Until the formation of a proper Solomon legal body, there were often overlapping or 
concurrent jurisdictions in the Solomons, and it had to be worked out on a case-by-case basis 
whether New Zealand RAMSI personnel should be tried locally, back in their home country, 
or within the institutions of the visiting force when they broke the law.
349
 With an eye on this 
legal grey zone, the purpose of the 2004 revised Crimes and Misconduct act is to  
―ensure that members of the police and other persons serving in overseas 
operations involving peacekeeping, the maintenance or restoration of law and order 
or functioning government institutions, or similar activities, are subject to the 
jurisdiction of New Zealand Courts for offences against New Zealand law 
committed overseas […].‖350 
In 2005, Karlyn Tekulu presented incidents to the public where RAMSI officers had 
participated in illegal activities like the purchase of alcohol on the black market and the 
encouragement of prostitution.
351
 Moore noted that ―RAMSI staff has become a substantial 
new elite in a way that has never existed so obviously in the Solomon Islands before.‖352 In a 
2007 sitting of the Solomon Parliament, Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare also expressed 
his wish to re-consider the RAMSI members' legal immunities and asked for a change of the 
‗Facilitation Act‘. In a later interview with Radio Australia, Foreign Minister Alexander 
Downer responded that if the act was substantially changed to remove legal immunities 
granted to mission members, then the mission would be destroyed. "That is a message that 
Prime Minister Sogavare needs to understand and in particular his AG [attorney-general] Mr 
Moti, who probably wants to destroy RAMSI, needs to understand. If the Solomons does 
destroy RAMSI, one of the ways they could do it would be to remove those immunities, it 
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could be catastrophic.‖353 Australia demonstrated clearly that it would not allow its personnel 
to fall under local law; no matter – more or less – what they did while on duty.  
5.12 Conclusion  
The case of the Solomon Islands is of limited value for an examination of the Green Party‘s 
impact on national foreign policy decision-making as the Greens did not oppose New 
Zealand‘s contribution to the RAMSI mission. In consensus with the rest of parliament, they 
endorsed the mission since the political circumstances matched the Green‘s standards for 
supporting foreign troop deployments. The breakdown of central state functions and the threat 
of gang violence in the Solomons created a humanitarian crisis that necessitated the 
intervention of an external force to restore law and order. Another important factor for the 
Greens was the official invitation of RAMSI by the Solomon government. The endorsement 
and authorisation of the operation by the PIF also played a significant role behind the party‘s 
support for the mission. According to Keith Locke, the situation in Honiara was too urgent to 
wait for the UN‘s time-consuming decision-making, though in the end, the intervention was 
―effectively endorsed by the world community and the United Nations‖354, and no criticism 
came from abroad that the mission should never have taken place. 
However, with the benefit of hindsight, the Greens have a few points of criticism of the 
mission as a whole. One is with Australia‘s dominance within the military operation. The 
Greens disapproved of the Australian focus on armed forces backing up an operation that had 
originally been designated a police mission with long term administrative and advisory 
support. This was excessive and unnecessary in their view.  
Another point of critique is the influence of New Zealand and Australian officials placed in 
government positions in the Solomons. According to Locke, this caused problems with the 
local model of government established after RAMSI. In his view, this model was biased too 
much in favour of Australian and New Zealand standards and thus, the quicker the complete 
withdrawal of RAMSI, including the police forces as well as civil services, could be achieved, 
the better it would be in terms of letting the Solomon Islanders run their country on their 
own.
355
 However, political and cultural institutions will not reach western standards for the 
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next few years while creating a modified national identity will probably take decades.
356
 
Putting pressure on local traditions is not a productive way to develop a functional political 
culture. Infrastructure is often missing and the education level still low. Indeed, while RAMSI 
has been successful in assisting and supporting administrative and social reforms, the ultimate 
driving force for sustainable reform has to come from the Solomon Islanders themselves. The 
future of the Solomon Islands lies in the hands of its citizens. Gordon Nanau noted that if 
RAMSI was genuine in its efforts but decent in its demands, the relationship between RAMSI 
and the local population would improve.
357
 
Finding a working solution for the political re-design of the Solomon Islands is tricky, as they 
are a vital part of the South Pacific and political impacts or changes can affect the whole 
region. The original goal of RAMSI was a quick, pre-emptive intervention, but rather than 
just influencing Solomon policy, it triggered a major shift in the region-wide policy 
approaches of countries like Australia and New Zealand. However, it became clear that an 
external military and police force has limits in dealing with the root causes of instability.  
It cannot be ruled out that the conflict in the Solomon Islands was just the tip of the iceberg 
and other parts of the region might suffer from instability in the near future. These will likely 
be triggered by troubles caused by globalization, post-colonialism, climate change, resource 
management, the lack of education, as well as the growing concern of foreign powers over the 
region‘s fate and future.358 As necessary and helpful as RAMSI has proved to be, using it as a 
mobile patrol group for the whole South Pacific region might be counter-productive in the 
long term. This is a matter that the Greens will have to reconsider regarding their position on 
RAMSI and their support for future missions. So far, the decision-making process within the 
organisation has been largely influenced by Australia and its interests, risking alienating 
smaller and weaker member states like New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, and Tonga, 
particularly when their interests differ from Australian targets.  
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6 Afghanistan 
New Zealand‘s involvement in the Afghanistan conflict differs fundamentally from its 
participation in the Solomon Islands and East Timor crises. While the Solomons are a part of 
New Zealand‘s regional neighbourhood and East Timor can be considered as a part of the 
wider regional interest zone, there is no geographical link to Afghanistan. New Zealand-
Afghan relations were limited before 2001, with no significant diplomatic or economic 
exchange between the two countries.  
Additionally, New Zealand made a different kind of contribution in Afghanistan than it had 
made elsewhere. Police forces and administrative support workers with a military back-up 
were sent to the Solomons, while a ‗Provincial Reconstruction Team‘ (PRT) and ‗Special Air 
Service‘ (SAS) forces were sent to Afghanistan.  The length of New Zealand‘s involvement in 
Afghanistan also distinguishes the case from the deployments in East Timor and the Solomon 
Islands, where most troops, especially armed forces, were withdrawn after a few months. In 
contrast, New Zealand forces in Afghanistan have been deployed since 2001. They remain 
involved in combat situations and there is no clear perspective when the war will be over.  
The Green Party opposed from the beginning every kind of contribution to the ‗International 
Security Assistance Force‘ (ISAF), including the PRT.359 However, even when they were to a 
certain extend part of the government – due to the confidence and supply agreement – they 
remained unable to stop the deployment. While most Greens over the years eventually 
accepted and acknowledged the work done by the PRT, the party kept opposing the 
deployment of the SAS. To express their reluctance against the war they directed the public‘s 
interest towards domestic consequences, such as anti-terrorism legislations or the intercept 
facility in Waihopai. By creating such public awareness they indirectly put pressure on the 
Labour government leading to a withdrawal of the troops in 2005. However, when the 
National-led government decided the 2009 re-deployment of the SAS the Greens faced their 
old problem: Their power was insufficient in terms of influencing the government‘s decision 
making.    
6.1 Background  
Afghan history is politically diverse and culturally rich, but was heavily disrupted through 
foreign interventions in the last 30 years. Political turmoil, including a de facto coup in 1973, 
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the assassination of a prominent party leader and an overthrow of the government in 1978, 
had already upset the country‘s stability before the Soviet Union invaded in 1979. The Soviet 
occupation lasted for ten years, accompanied by constant combat between Russian troops and 
Mujaheddin fighters funded by the West. After Moscow withdrew its troops in 1989, 
Afghanistan fell into a state of civil war, resulting in the establishment of the Taleban-regime 
in Kabul from 1996 onwards. In the following years the Taleban gained control over nearly 
80 per cent of the country. When the United States started its war on terror in late 2001, the 
invasion of Afghanistan forced the Taleban to withdraw from Kabul, flee into the backcountry 
and launch guerrilla attacks on the western troops in the province. They went into a ―hide-
and-disperse mode, using time and stealth as [their] mode of cover until the correlation of 
forces [became] more propitious for a resumption of military activities based on the element 
of surprise.‖360 This remains the state of affairs in 2010. 
6.2 Domestic debates 
When shortly after 9/11 the decision was made to send troops to Afghanistan to fight 
terrorism in the form of Al-Qaida and the Taleban, the Green Party defended the position that 
―a massive military assault on a country like Afghanistan would be likely to lead to more 
innocent civilians being killed. It would only foster more anger in the Islamic world, and 
produce more terrorists in the long run.―361 They opposed New Zealand‘s contribution to the 
war by not only speaking out against it, but also by supporting a protest movement. When 
thousands of protesters gathered in Wellington in mid-September 2001, expressing their 
discomfort with the government‘s offer of military support in Afghanistan, Green Party co-
leader Jeanette Fitzsimons made an appeal to keep alive the belief that vengeance and 
retaliation lead only to more violence and that the common goal must be a world where 
conflict is resolved through negotiation and justice.
362
  
New Zealand‘s decision to participate in the Afghanistan conflict was made in a climate of 
unbroken international solidarity with the United States. Rod Donald expressed his 
condolences to the United States on behalf of the Green Party directly after the 9/11 attacks: 
―We stand and grieve with all Americans, with the other nations directly affected and with all 
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the peaceful people of the world.―363 Significantly Donald ended his speech with ―We 
dedicate ourselves to peaceful solutions to the challenges before us.‖364 Jeanette Fitzsimons 
admonished: ―We must not listen to those calls [for retaliation] or we risk escalating the 
horror until it leads to a global conflict. That may, in fact, be the outcome that this attack was 
designed to provoke.‖365 During the first days after the attacks Helen Clark stayed reluctant to 
a certain degree to offer unlimited support to Washington. Members of the National Party, 
ACT, and New Zealand First put immense pressure on the government to make an assurance 
of military support to NZ`s allies.
366
 When Clark eventually offered the government‘s full 
support to the US,
367
 Fitzsimons warned insistently that New Zealand should wait for a 
specific UN resolution that authorised the use of force.
368
  The powerful impact of 9/11 made 
refusing to join and support the war on terror a political impossibility for most states, 
including New Zealand. With the world in a state of shock, politicians from all over were 
afraid to be seen as not doing enough to combat terrorism.  
The motivation for war has always been the achievement of political objectives. Valerie 
Morse reflected it would be naïve to imagine that the driving force behind the war in 
Afghanistan was only the fighting of terrorist groups; neither was it exclusively the 
international demand for a constant oil supply. Afghanistan occupies a geo-strategically 
significant position between the Middle East, China, India and Russia.
369
 The country borders 
Pakistan and Iran, which are both considered as political hot spots with unstable governments. 
For these reasons, Afghanistan is a location with high importance to the United States and its 
allies. 
When it became evident in late September 2001 that the United States would invade 
Afghanistan, to fight the Taleban and Al-Qaida, New Zealand‘s ―traditionally […] anti-
militarist‖370 Labour Party offered its full support for the mission. The Greens initially 
addressed Helen Clark in a letter, arguing that any offer of military assistance to the forces 
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deployed in Afghanistan would be counterproductive and inappropriate. They asked the 
government to withdraw the offer of a SAS contribution made by Phil Goff beforehand and 
made clear that a contribution of military personnel or equipment should only be agreed to if 
its use conformed with international law and it was under United Nations command. Also 
they claimed the troops should be used exclusively to combat terrorists and bring them to 
trial. Revenge and retaliation as a motive for the mission were strictly ruled out by the 
Greens.
371
 Goff replied that force had to be one of the components of New Zealand‘s 
involvement in the conflict, ―because consistent diplomatic efforts through the United Nations 
over 3 years to deal with the Taleban have failed utterly.‖372 However, the adoption of UN 
resolution 1373 on 28
th
 September 2001 can eventually be seen as a signal that the 
international community not only agreed on a public proscription of the 11 September attacks, 
but also encouraged the taking of necessary measures to punish the criminals responsible for 
the bombings. Yet, Resolution 1373 did not explicitly authorise the use of force in 
Afghanistan.
373
  
In their Foreign Affairs Policy the Green Party took a highly sceptical view of the war on 
terror: ―New Zealand should oppose the undermining of accepted international human rights 
standards which have accompanied the so-called 'war on terror'.―374 Former party co-leader 
Rod Donald called the Afghanistan intervention an ‗undeclared war‘, arguing that ―[e]ven 
when the perpetrators are identified – and they must be punished – we would urge restraint 
and insist that a rash and violent response would only increase the loss of life, especially of 
the innocent.‖375  
On the 20
th
 September thousands of protesters gathered in Wellington to express their 
discomfort with the government‘s offer of military support in Afghanistan. Two weeks later 
the government nonetheless reinforced its commitment to the US-led Operation Enduring 
Freedom starting on the 7
th
 October 2001. The commitment had the support of all parties 
except the seven MPs of the Green Party. Helen Clark condemned the lack of unity by the 
Greens in regards to foreign troop deployment and stated she would have preferred seeing a 
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unanimous decision on the topic in parliament.
376
 Donald countered in an interview he would 
be sure ―that Alliance MPs and a number of Labour MPs aren't happy with what's 
happened.―377 Indeed, according to media reports in early October the Alliance has been 
―extremely uncomfortable about the soldiers being deployed to Afghanistan and [was] hoping 
the Americans [would] not make a formal request for military assistance‖378. Alliance MP 
Matt Robson announced in public that no UN resolution had authorised the unleashing of 
military force and initiated thereby a rather unpleasant parliamentary debate for Helen 
Clark.
379
 Nevertheless, in the end the Alliance eventually supported the government in its 
commitment to the US and NATO. 
6.3 The Alliance 
Indeed, the party conglomerate ‗Alliance‘, while bound to Labour as a smaller coalition 
partner, supported the military commitment in the vote but suffered from deep inner-party 
disagreements on the subject; ultimately leading to a complete fracture of the Alliance.
380
 
Alliance-leader and Deputy Prime Minister, Jim Anderton, pressured the party‘s MPs and 
Cabinet Ministers to accept the need to support the government policy towards the US-led 
war on terror, in particular the military campaign against the Taleban in Afghanistan. The 
party followed Anderton in this case, but in the long term the rupture within the party proved 
too great, leading to a split between the different ‗sub-parties‘ within the Alliance.381  
After a series of attempts by both factions to push each other aside, Anderton declared in 
April 2002 that he planned to leave the Alliance and form a new political movement that 
would contest the next general election.
382
 These circumstances endangered the coalition with 
Labour, and a stable and effectively working government could no longer be guaranteed. As a 
result, Clark announced a snap election to be held on the 27
th
 July 2002; four months before 
the next general election was required. The Alliance contested the election but remained 
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below the 5 per cent threshold for proportional representation. After that electoral disaster the 
party ―that had won 18.2 per cent of the poll and come third in its first general election in 
1993 virtually disappeared from the New Zealand political map less than nine years later.‖383  
This example highlights how powerfully foreign affairs can interact with domestic policy. 
However, although New Zealand‘s involvement in Afghanistan had such a heavy influence on 
the domestic affairs of the country, no party picked up the topic as a theme for the following 
election campaigns. The Green Party, which triggered domestic disruption through its initial 
resistance to the troop contribution, failed to make use of the topic and present themselves as 
a non-violent ‗peace-party‘.384 
However, when Ron Donald was asked under which circumstances the Greens would support 
a troop contribution to Afghanistan he highlighted, in full accordance with his party 
colleagues, the importance of United Nations authorisation for the mission. He also remarked 
that Osama Bin Laden would only be ―where he is because the Americans trained him, 
financed him and equipped him.‖385 Bombing Afghanistan for reasons like revenge or 
retaliation would only cause an increased sympathy for terrorism among the Afghan people.  
This point of view was also shared by the Green Party in Australia. Even the Green Party of 
the United States opposed the war and claimed the best way to convert people to terrorism 
would be to drop bombs on their families. In addition, the Irish Green Party had disapproved 
the taking of military action, pointing to their experience with terrorism, and concluded the 
defeat of suicide bombers using traditional military means would be virtually impossible.
386
 
On a global scale the Afghanistan case put Green parties in a strange situation, where many of 
them were left opposing the war, while the German Greens, one of the most influential Green 
parties in the world, backed it up.
387
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6.4 Justification and Legitimacy 
From the very beginning there has been controversy about the war‘s legitimacy. The United 
States addressed the UN Security Council twice in this regard since the 9/11 attacks. As a 
result the Security Council passed the resolutions 1368 and 1373 which condemned the 
attacks, and ordered  
―the freezing of assets; the criminalizing of terrorist activity; the prevention of the 
commission of and support for terrorist attacks; the taking of necessary steps to 
prevent the commission of terrorist activity, including the sharing of information; 
and urging the ratification and enforcement of the international conventions against 
terrorism.‖388  
Yet, neither of the two resolutions openly authorised the use of force. Consequently the 
Security Council had not and could not authorise the use of unilateral military force as 
undertaken by the US and the UK, known as Operation Enduring Freedom.  
The United States as well as the United Kingdom quickly referred to Article 51of the UN-
Charter, which provides all nations with a right to collective or individual self-defence. The 
fact that the United Kingdom claimed in front of the Security Council that it also had taken 
action in Afghanistan under the legitimacy of Article 51 is somehow bizarre as there had been 
no attack in the UK up to that time.
389
  Nevertheless, defenders of the Operation Enduring 
Freedom argued that an UN-authorization was not needed because the invasion was an act of 
collective self-defence instead an act of aggression. However, many authors writing and 
discussing self-defence against specific terrorist acts or groups neglect to address the issue of 
state-involvement declared in Article 51.
390
 
The United States reported to the UN Security Council it would have ―clear and compelling 
information that the Al-Qaeda organization, which is supported by the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan, had a central role in the attacks.‖391 They failed to present significant evidence 
to underline this thesis, but got away with it as the solidarity with the post 9/11 support for the 
United States from around the world was overwhelming. One of the few pieces of evidence 
presented to the public was a dossier issued by the British government pointing out the 
reciprocal relationship between Osama Bin Laden and the Taleban. It postulated that both 
maintained ―a close and mutually dependent alliance. […] Usama bin Laden could not operate 
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his terrorist activities without the alliance and support of the Taliban regime.‖392 Andreas 
Laursen summarised that the exact relationship between Al-Qaida and the ruling Taleban 
regime remained unknown in the end, but it should be reasonably clear that the liaison 
between the two groups could not be characterised as one in which the Taleban had a role of 
organising, planning or coordinating the 9/11 attacks. Therefore the assumption that the 
Taleban were in control of Al-Qaida has to be rejected. This is a claim that the Taleban did 
refute: they rejected over 20 US requests for the extradition of Osama Bin Laden after the 
1998 bombings on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
393
  
Consequently, critics noted several reasons why the bombing of Afghanistan has not been a 
case of legitimate self-defence under Article 51. On the one hand, the attacks in New York 
and Washington D.C. were criminal attacks carried out by a group of individual non-state 
actors and not armed attacks by another state.
394
 To make a state responsible for an attack 
carried out by a terrorist group, such a group must at least be an irregular force sent by the 
particular state, or the state must have a substantial involvement in the group‘s deployment. 
But, as has been pointed out, the 9/11 attacks were committed by individuals, not acting 
directly on behalf of the Afghan state.
395
  
On the other hand, there was no concrete threat of an armed attack on the US after the 11
th
 
September; otherwise the US would probably not have waited until early October before 
starting its bombing campaign. According to the rules of international law affirmed by the UN 
General Assembly, the requirement for self-defence must be a threat that is ―instant, 
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.‖396  
For New Zealand‘s Labour government Washington‘s reference to Article 51 was ultimately a 
good enough reason to support Operation Enduring Freedom. Helen Clark pointed out, 
―[T]he magnitude of the terrorist attacks justifies a military response in self defence, as 
provided for under article 51.‖397 In strong disagreement, Keith Locke made clear that the 
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„Greens did not accept Helen Clark's belief that Article 51 of the United Nations Charter […] 
justified the US-led attacks.―398 
6.5 The Bonn Agreement and NATO 
The Afghanistan intervention has been supported by a wide range of supra-national agencies 
like the UN, the ‗Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council‘ (EAPC), and the ‗North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation‘ (NATO).  In December 2001, representatives from different Afghan political 
groups opposing the Taliban joined a conference held in Bonn, Germany. The group was 
guided by later Afghan president Hamid Karzai. The United Nations hosted and supervised 
the conference. The initial goal was to design a plan for governing Afghanistan after law and 
order had been restored. The so called Bonn Agreement was signed on the 5
th
 December 2001. 
One day later the UN Security Council ratified the agreement with Resolution 1383. The 
resolution gave legitimacy to the establishment of the ISAF under the command of NATO.  
ISAF was supposed to remove the Taleban regime and maintain security for the 
reconstruction teams in Kabul and the surrounding areas.
399
 Furthermore the Bonn Agreement 
defined further goals like the enforcement of a democratically elected government, the 
establishment of a legal framework and judicial system, as well as support for an interim 
administration.
400
 Until these goals could be reached the Bonn Agreement entrusted 
governance for six months to the ‗Afghan Interim Administration‘ (AIA). When the AIA-
mandate came to an end in June 2002 some 1,500 Afghan delegates met in a transitional 
emergency Loya Riga and elected the ‗Afghan Transitional Authority‘ (ATA) which held 
power until the presidential elections in October 2004. However, the first parliamentary 
election did not occur before September 2005.
401
  
Simultaneously the ‗United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan‘ (UNAMA) was 
established on 28 March 2002 under the UN Security Council resolution 1401. Its task largely 
followed the model of the Bonn Agreement and the ISAF mandate. The promotion of national 
reconciliation, the establishment of a functioning legal system, and the dealing with human 
rights and gender issues are prominent examples of their work. UNAMA also managed all 
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United Nation‘s humanitarian relief, recovery and reconstruction activities in Afghanistan in 
close co-ordination with the AIA, the ATA and the 2004 elected Afghan government under 
Hamid Karzai.
402
 
It has been argued that the ISAF mission was successful in the short term, because the 
Taleban had been removed from the capitol. Consequently, security as well as stability in 
Kabul started to improve, although this was not true for the rest of the country. The rapid 
military successes during the first months of the ISAF campaign were limited to the region 
around Kabul. Although, when the fighting shifted to wilder geographic regions, frustration 
and stagnation of the military campaign followed quickly.
403
 The rural areas were still 
characterised by increasing rates of criminality and the despotic rule of warlords and violent 
gangs over the local population. Looting, repression, abuse, armed combat and unofficial tax 
collection were widespread and, at the same time, showed the incapability of local police 
forces to protect residents.   
As a result, NATO eventually took command of the US-led ISAF troops in October 2003. It 
was only now that the Operation Enduring Freedom’s existence had been acknowledged by 
the United Nations. However, it still had not been authorised by the UN.
404
 The mission, 
which was originally limited to the area around Kabul, was now officially extended to cover 
all of Afghanistan‘s territory.  
The United States never had much interest in seeing ISAF troops in the provinces, because 
American Special Forces had established vital connections to various armed Afghan groups 
and did not want to see these relations disrupted by ISAF interference. Therefore the US 
strictly refused to provide either troops or logistical, intelligence or air evacuation services to 
forces from other contributing countries. Effectively, this meant that ISAF was literally 
unable to operate beyond Kabul before NATO took command in 2003.
405
 The NATO mission 
also decided to adopt and expand the PRT networks. From 2003-2006 ISAF incorporated 25 
PRTs under its command. However, PRTs are considered to represent just the ―tip of the 
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iceberg‖406 – a PRT without links to military forces is not conceivable. Consequently, there 
are always close links between PRTs and their military back-ups in the province. 
The Afghanistan operation is not only NATO‘s first mission outside of Europe, but also its 
largest ever operational deployment.
407
At present, the number of ISAF troops has grown from 
the original 5,000 to around 120,000 troops from 47 countries, including the current 28 
NATO member states.
408
 
6.6 New Zealand’s Involvement 
New Zealand‘s involvement in Afghanistan is considered the nation‘s largest defence force 
contribution.
409
 The contribution to East Timor might have had a larger number of personnel 
but the troops were stationed for a shorter period of time. While most forces in East Timor 
were withdrawn after six months, New Zealand‘s engagement in Afghanistan continues 
nearly a decade later. Naturally the number of troops deployed in six-month rotations in 
Afghanistan added up over time and thereby outnumbered the East Timor contingent. Patman 
described New Zealand‘s effort as ―a substantial but measured contribution to the US-led war 
on terror.‖410 
New Zealand‘s main contribution to ISAF was a PRT and an SAS contingent. Both teams 
have to be seen as disconnected groups, serving different functions within different forces. 
New Zealand also contributed an air force Hercules aircraft to Afghanistan; the use of an 
ANZAC frigate, an Orion surveillance aircraft and 242 navy and air force personnel in a 
Canadian-led force patrolling the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman. On the domestic level, 
the government allocated NZ$30 million over three years to boost New Zealand‘s domestic 
counter-terrorism measures in police, customs, immigration, intelligence, and defence 
areas.
411
 The 70 SAS troops, which had been stationed in Afghanistan since December 2001, 
were expected to engage directly with enemy combatants. Additionally, 140 PRT personnel, 
first deployed in 2003, operate to provide humanitarian assistance within a restricted 
geographic area called the Bamiyan province. The PRT‘s purposes are building local 
confidence through its contact with community leaders, supporting the establishment of 
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democratic institutions, and supervising local elections – to name a few. Its biggest 
achievement, so far, has been the rebuilding of Bamiyan‘s university.412 The Greens appraised 
that ―most of the work done by the Kiwi Provincial Reconstruction Team in Bamiyan has 
been welcomed by the locals.‖413  
Four days before the first NZ SAS troops were sent to Afghanistan the Green Party urged the 
government to have a special parliamentary debate on the matter. The Greens highlighted the 
points of agreement as well as the points of disagreement with the other parties in the House. 
They acknowledged the tragic losses of the 9/11 attacks and stated: ―On that day we were all 
Americans.‖414 Under the strong impact of the attacks, the Greens agreed that the terrorists 
responsible for the bombing would have to be caught and brought to justice, preferably in 
front of the ‗International Criminal Court‘ (ICC), which is not yet in effect. In contrast to 
most other parties, the Greens opposed the idea of invading Afghanistan with military force, 
saying they did not believe that sending  NZ SAS troops under the command of an American-
led task force would help to bring those responsible for the 9/11 bombings to justice, or 
reduce the threat of international terrorism. Instead they pointed out that the anticipated 
suffering of Afghan civilians would result in hate and an increased support for terrorist groups 
in the Arab world. „If the bombs start dropping on innocent Afghanis, then, just as on 
September 11 we were all Americans, on that day we would all be Afghanis.―415  
The Greens feared that, in contrast to the earlier commitment in East Timor, the Afghan 
mission would not be a surgical SAS strike to bring out Osama Bin Laden, but rather a major 
assault on the Afghan nation. Locke argued the international community should focus on the 
endorsement of UN-sanctions and, if anything or anyone was to be deployed to Afghanistan, 
then it should have been medical teams and support workers to solve the contemporary 
refugee problem rather than armed soldiers. Locke commented, „Aid not bombs is what the 
Afghans need. If anything is dropped onto Afghanistan, let it be food and medicine, not 
bombs.―416 However, when Locke presented this idea in Parliament, Helen Clark made very 
clear that this might be an additional option, but New Zealand‘s priority would be the 
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provision of intelligence information, diplomatic support and the deployment of SAS 
forces.
417
  
Shortly after the Operation Enduring Freedom had begun the United States contributed 
NZ$700 million to a UN fund for emergency relief assistance in Afghan provinces which 
were or would be hit by war damages. New Zealand contributed one million dollars, five days 
before the SAS forces were sent to Afghanistan.
418
 This can be – and has been – interpreted as 
‗buying in the war‘. Examples in history where two states went to war and one state has paid 
money to the other at the beginning are fairly rare. It used to be more common that the loser 
was forced to pay at the end of the war. Keith Locke claimed the discussion about offering aid 
came at a time when public opinion in New Zealand and elsewhere was turning against the 
war, as more civilians were killed. He criticised: "The Greens don't want humanitarian aid to 
be used as a smokescreen to make the Government's SAS commitment more acceptable. It 
would be much better for the Government to demand an end to the bombing […].―419 
6.7 SAS 2001-2005 
The ‗New Zealand Special Air Service‘ (NZ SAS) looks back on a long tradition within the 
New Zealand Defence Force. It was formed in 1955 as an elite unit capable of undertaking 
unconventional warfare and it represents the premier combat unit of New Zealand. Its key 
roles are to undertake overseas missions and respond adequately in case of domestic terrorist 
attacks. The SAS hold strategic alliances with the British and the Australian SAS forces.  
In October 2001 hectic parliamentary debates
420
 started about whether New Zealand should 
contribute SAS forces to Afghanistan, and, if yes, in what numbers. But instead of examining 
the topic in a critical manner, the parties seemed to be competing over which party supported 
deployment the most. Only the Greens expressed reluctance to the use of force and stated that 
they would not be ―convinced that sending SAS troops […] will help bring to justice those 
responsible for the 11 September bombings.‖421 Consequently, the Greens did not support the 
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deployment and were criticised harshly for their attitude.
422
 They also requested a 
modification of the official resolution concerning the SAS deployment: The phrase ‗and in 
accordance with international law, with the objective of apprehending terrorists and bringing 
them to trial, not for revenge or retaliation‘ should be added to the document.423 However, the 
Greens and the Alliance were the only parties favouring this amendment and so it was 
eventually voted down in parliament.
424
 
Starting in December 2001, the SAS began officially assisting in the ‗war on terror‘ in 
Afghanistan. The first deployment was for twelve months, with two subsequent deployments, 
each for six months. New Zealand‘s contribution to the ISAF troops was warmly welcomed in 
the United States. President George W. Bush had already informed Helen Clark that he 
expected the campaign to be long term, and he very much appreciated New Zealand‘s 
commitment.
425
 Richard Armitage, the Deputy Secretary of State, said he would be 
―absolutely thrilled‖426 about New Zealand standing alongside the US in combating terrorism. 
The size of each SAS contingent varied between approximately 40 and 65 personnel, with all 
deployments working alongside other special forces from Canada, Australia or the US. On 
several occasions NZ SAS soldiers have been involved in direct combat actions with hostile 
armed Afghan groups. Casualties were suffered on both sides. So far, no New Zealand SAS 
soldier has been killed.
427
 
The first New Zealanders were injured roughly one year after the start of Operation Enduring 
Freedom. On the 23
rd
 October 2002 TVNZ reported three New Zealanders were involved in a 
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land mine accident, resulting in heavy injuries to the soldiers.
428
 The Greens appealed 
immediately to the government to re-think its Afghanistan strategy and reconsider if New 
Zealand troops should remain in Afghanistan.
429
  
In June 2004 two NZ SAS soldiers were wounded in a gun-battle in central Afghanistan. 
Shortly after this incident the NZ SAS received – with units from five other nations – a US 
presidential unit citation, which represents a senior unit award for excellent or heroic military 
service. Conservative commentators in New Zealand used this as evidence for the success of 
the ISAF mission and in particular the role of the NZ SAS. Conservatives tried to utilise the 
event calling for a further NZ commitment in the Iraq war. Critics argued the presidential unit 
citation was a relatively minor honour, given as a standard procedure to many US allies, and 
that it by no means acknowledged the accomplishments of the SAS itself, but rather the 
accomplishments of the multinational forces as a whole. Left-wing observers exploited the 
unit citation to embarrass the Labour government in public, claiming the award would show 
how deeply interwoven the government was in the ‗dirty‘ war led by the US.430  
When in 2005 a decision had to be made about whether New Zealand should extend its troop 
deployments to Afghanistan, Keith Locke took advantage of the ‗Bagram prisoner abuse 
scandal,‘ which had become public earlier that year. This scandal, in combination with the 
public awareness about the US prisons in Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib,provoked 
worldwide anger.
431
 Locke increased the pressure on the government, identifying New 
Zealand troops as handymen for American torture and mistreatment of prisoners. He stated:  
"It is mind blowing that our Government should choose now, in the midst of the 
Bagram prisoner abuse scandal […] to send the SAS back to Afghanistan. […]The 
unavoidable question is whether our SAS on 'direct action' missions will hand over 
Afghan prisoners to the US forces for possible torture and death […]. This 
deployment should not go ahead. If it does, the very least the Government should 
do is explain to New Zealanders how it will avoid any prisoners that are handed 
over being mistreated.‖432  
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When the Labour Party announced in late 2005 that no more NZ SAS forces would be 
deployed in Afghanistan the Greens welcomed this decision and emphasised that future 
engagements in Afghanistan should focus exclusively on peacekeeping and the work of the 
PRTs.
433
 Although Labour eventually refused to renew the SAS deployment, the ‗prisoner 
issue‘ remained unsolved but played an important role later in 2008/09 when a re-deployment 
under the National government was discussed.  
6.8 US FTA NZ 
The commitment of SAS troops to the ISAF forces undoubtedly had a positive impact on the 
US-NZ diplomatic relationship. The Labour government had hopes the commitment would 
benefit their negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement with the US, worth an estimated NZ$1 
billion per year to New Zealand. Privately, US officials had already warned the government 
that its response to the 9/11 attacks would have a strong impact on the future relations of the 
two countries.
434
 The Green Party criticised Labour‘s apparent driving force behind the SAS 
undertaking: "However much the Labour/Alliance government wants a free trade agreement 
with the United States, it shouldn't be traded off in lives."
435
 Green Party co-leader Rod 
Donald also found harsh words to criticise Labour‘s attitude towards the Afghanistan 
involvement and their hopes for a FTA with the United States:  
"Some of that blood is unavoidably on the hands of our Government, which wanted 
to 'prove' its commitment to the US in order to secure a free-trade agreement. [...] 
The deployment of SAS troops opened the White House door a crack. Now, we've 
actually got a foot over the threshold, at the cost of a frigate, an Orion and our self 
respect.‖436 
At the end, New Zealand‘s hopes for a joint Australia-NZ-US FTA vanished when a FTA 
between Australia and the United States was concluded in early 2004; explicitly excluding 
New Zealand. There are various explanations given why New Zealand had been excluded 
from the negotiations. New Zealand‘s negative response towards troop commitments to Iraq 
was one reason. Helen Clark‘s public announcement that this war would not have been started 
if Al Gore had become the American president instead of George W. Bush in the 2000 US-
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election did not benefit US-NZ relations either.
437
 Other issues which hindered the 
involvement of New Zealand in the Australian-US negotiations were American annoyance 
about the cancelation of the F-16 deal in 2000,
438
 as well as New Zealand‘s position on the 
nuclear issue.
439
  
6.9 Public Opinion 
With an ongoing war and first casualties reported, public criticism of the involvement 
increased. The given reasons for the war – e.g. the hunt for Osama bin Laden and the battle 
against Al-Qaida – were widely questioned. The international community‘s approach to 
resolving the Afghan problems were also seen critically by a constantly growing number of 
people. Paul Buchanan asserted in 2002 that the hunt for Osama bin Laden and his entourage 
had ―receded from the public eye as much as it ha[d] been slowed in its achievements.‖440  
It becomes apparent that the once unbroken solidarity with the United States had vanished 
between 2001 and 2010.
441
 US foreign policy became a largely critical field of interest for 
academia, the media and conspiracy theorists. This led to a wider awareness, and therefore it 
has had a much higher impact on public opinion than, for example, the 2003 conflict in the 
Solomon Islands. Morse claimed the ongoing war in Afghanistan would still be ―far from the 
public‘s consciousness‖442 and suggested it would be in the interest of all NZ politicians, who 
hold some sort of responsibility for the troop deployment, to keep it that way.
443
 Indeed, 
public opinion has a large impact on election results. For that reason it is a factor politicians 
always keep in mind when announcing or commenting on their latest decisions. The 
Afghanistan involvement can rightly be considered an unpopular topic for discussion among 
politicians of any New Zealand government.  Helen Clark‘s Labour government, as well as 
the National government under John Key, remained publically silent when both decided to 
send SAS forces to Afghanistan in 2001 and 2009 respectively.
444
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The deployment of combat forces to a foreign country is a sensitive topic which usually has a 
strong impact on the public‘s opinion. Former Prime Minister Jenny Shipley made this very 
clear when New Zealand had to decide about the country‘s involvement in East Timor: ―No 
decision is more difficult for a Government than to send defence forces into risky areas to 
fight for peace.‖445 Thus, it is not in a government‘s interest to create more publicity around it 
than necessary. The public might not only reject the specific deployment – it might also 
express an increasing reluctance about the war as a whole. But after New Zealand‘s 
deployment was reported and confirmed on the White House website in September 2002, 
while the New Zealand government had remained silent, Prime Minister Helen Clark was 
forced to confirm the SAS troops had been sent to Afghanistan.
446
 When Defence Minster 
Mark Burton refused to comment on in which regions the SAS had conducted operations 
since its arrival in Afghanistan, Keith Locke complained. Locke found the needed information 
on two American web pages, which gave information about both the numbers of NZ troops 
and their location. He claimed New Zealanders should not accept a secret war in Afghanistan 
any more than they would have accepted it in Vietnam, or during the Second World War.
447
   
6.10 Impacts on New Zealand’s Domestic Legislation 
The intervention in Afghanistan gave New Zealand an opportunity to restore its tarnished 
relations to the US. New Zealand had also sent out a clear political signal after the troop 
contribution: The parliament passed the ‗Terrorism Suppression Act‘ (TSA) on the 8th 
October 2002. The legislation had been hastily put together
448
 and has been designed to 
tighten legislative measures against the supporting, funding, or harbouring of terrorists 
groups. The legislation includes a widespread empowerment of the Prime Minister:  
                                                                                                                                                                                          
additional troops to Afghanistan the presidents rankings in public polls decreased instantly. In a survey 
conducted before President Obama‘s decision to increase US troop levels in Afghanistan two groups were asked 
about their opinion on the US involvement in Afghanistan.  One group were members of the Council on Foreign 
Relations (CFR) and the other group represented the opinion of 2000 American adults interviewed via telephone. 
Both groups expressed pessimism about a scenario with long-term stability in Afghanistan. Only 46 per cent of 
the public and 41 per cent of the CFR members said it would be very or somewhat likely that Afghanistan would 
be able to withstand the threat posed by the Taliban in the future. While half of the CFR members (50 per cent) 
favoured increasing the number of troops in Afghanistan, just 32 per cent of the public agreed on this. See: The 
Pew Research Center for the People & the Press: U.S. seen as less important, China as more powerful  (3rd 
December 2009). Available at: http://people-press.org/report/?pageid=1631 
445 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (HANSARD), Vol. 580 (12 December 1996 to 5 October 1999), 
p.19461 (17 September 1999). 
446 See: Stephenson, SAS location revealed. 
447 See: Keith Locke, Web site undermines New Zealand’s secret war in Afghanistan (Press Release: 15th 
September 2002). Available at: http://www.greens.org.nz/press-releases/web-site-data-undermines-new-
zealands-secret-war-afghanistan 
448 See: Morse, Against Freedom: The War on Terrorism in Everyday New Zealand Life, p.20. 
90 
 
―The TSA establishes a legal framework for the suppression of terrorism. In 
particular, it is the mechanism by which New Zealand gives effect to the United 
Nations Security Council (‚UNSC‗) mandatory resolutions requiring UN member 
states to take certain steps to suppress terrorism. An important feature of this 
framework is the Prime Minister‘s power under the TSA to designate individuals or 
groups as terrorist or associated entities.―449  
The bill (originally called the Terrorism (Bombings and Financing) Bill) had the support of 
all parties in Parliament except the Greens.
450
 Keith Locke warned that „the bill‘s provisions 
undermined individual liberty and threatened lawful protests‖451 and such legislation ―should 
not be stampeded in wartime measures.‖452 Even if the Greens were not able to stop the 
passing of the bill they criticised the lack of a public submission procedure and raised a 
parliamentary discussion about the laws‘ inside.453 In particular, the lack of time for 
submissions and the rather hectic processing in parliament were criticised from an early 
stage.
454
 The Greens concerns about the possible threat that the new law would pose for 
unions and protest groups lead to the government‘s concession of a three week time period for 
submissions to the bill from the public.
455
 In their submission the Greens argued the bill was 
not specific enough in its definition of terrorism. For example, causing major economic loss 
was covered under the law as a reason to label criminals as terrorists. The Greens also 
disapproved permitting foreign countries‘ intelligence agencies to define who is a terrorist, 
noting this opportunity could be easily exploited by other countries to lay hands on political 
opponents or ordinary criminals on the run. They also protested that the enlarged 
empowerment of the Prime Minister to define who is a terrorist could only be contested 
through the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security as well as the Court of Appeal.
456
 
The Greens believed that the more ―people feel constrained by the State, the more likely they 
are to rebel against it.‖457 This was proved by the 150 civil submissions handed over to the 
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legislative by various church- , civil liberties- , trade union- and other community-groups.
458
 
The submissions as well as the Greens‘ Minority Report459 had to be taken into account and 
led to an extensive delay in the government‘s passing of the bill. When the bill eventually was 
passed in October 2002 Keith Locke remained critical that the bill would undermine civil 
liberties.
460
 The party still seeks the reversal of all anti-terror legislation that violates any 
―non-derogable human right norms.‖461 In conclusion Locke complained the whole discussion 
about it had been ―rather a strange debate‖462 that will leave people in the future to look at 
Hansard and ―puzzle a little bit.‖463  
6.11 Waihopai 
Another context in which the Greens linked the Afghanistan policy with a primary domestic 
issue is the debate about the so called ‗spy-base‘ in Waihopai. The ‗spy-base‘ is an intercept 
facility capable of electronically recording private communications. The station is under the 
command of the 1977 established ‗Government Communications Security Bureau‘ (GCSB). 
Since 1989 the GCSB operates the surveillance station at Waihopai near Blenheim that 
eavesdrops on international telephone, telex, fax and email communications. It also operates a 
base at Tangimoana near Bulls, which monitors radio signals.  
The GCSB is linked with agencies in the United States, Britain, Canada and Australia. All 
five states operate with the ECHELON network which is „associated with a global network of 
computers that automatically search through millions of intercepted messages for pre-
programmed keywords or fax, telex and e-mail addresses. Every word of every message in the 
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frequencies and channels selected at a station is automatically searched.‖464 Since the New 
Zealand station can intercept only a small proportion of communications in the Pacific region 
it must work jointly with other stations in the region. In this context the Geraldton base in 
Australia has been referred to as Waihopai‘s ‗sister station‘.465 The Greens argue the 
Waihopai base operates in general more for the benefit of American and British interests 
rather than for the benefit of New Zealand. It is exempt from key provisions of the Privacy 
Act and the Crimes Act and it costs New Zealand approximately NZ$35 million per year to 
run.
466
  
In fact the operation of the station had already been criticised by the Green Party before 9/11. 
They claimed the United States would gain information by using the ‗ECHELON‘ system to 
gain a commercial advantage in the global economy.
467
 This was denied by the Labour 
government which assured neither New Zealand nor the United States would misuse the 
monitoring station for such purposes.
468
  
Since July 2001 the Greens opposed all legislative renewals linked to the GCSB and its 
powers. Keith Locke not only wrote letters to  Helen Clark, complaining how the law would 
affect New Zealanders‘ right to the sanctity of their private communication, but he alarmed 
the foreign embassies in Wellington by informing them how the upcoming modification of the 
law would threaten their diplomatic  immunity.
469
 After 9/11 the Greens tried to use the 
attacks as an argument for closing down the Waihopai station since the ECHELON system 
had provided ―no value in pre-empting the September 11 attack.‖470 In the following years the 
Greens continued opposing all legal amendments dealing with the GCSB matters.
471
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Phil Goff commented that the intelligence information supplied by the Waihopai intercept 
facility would be a more valuable and greater contribution for New Zealand‘s allies than the 
SAS and PRT personnel sent to Afghanistan.
472
 This was also acknowledged in a US 
Congressional report that claimed New Zealand‘s two significant contributions to the war in 
Afghanistan would be the sending of SAS troops and the information delivered by the 
monitoring station in Waihopai.
473
  
The base raised public interest in New Zealand‘s links with the international security policy of 
the United States. In particular the Green Party linked the new security standards in New 
Zealand with the international post-9/11 security approach led from the US. The party feared 
that New Zealand‘s intelligence activity in duty for the United States could damage the 
relations to the Pacific Island States, France, or Japan,
474
 ―because there is obviously a huge 
diplomatic downside to New Zealand being portrayed as a spying tool of the Bush, Blair and 
Howard governments.‖475 
In 2004 it became apparent that the communication of UN Chief Weapons Inspector Hans 
Blix had been spied on and made available to allies of the United States and Britain. The 
public was aghast and the Greens reacted with shock.
476
 However, when they questioned the 
Labour Party about the matter in parliament Helen Clark fell back to the universal 
government habit of refusing any comments on security matters;
477
 a tactic the National Party 
seemed to be happy keeping when asked about the role of the GCSB in 2010.
478
  
The secrecy around New Zealand‘s security and intelligence agencies has been criticised by 
Green MPs from an early stage. Rod Donald noted in 1999 that only five out of 120 Members 
of Parliament were part of the ‗Intelligence and Security Committee‘ (ISC) and the remaining 
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115 were not allowed to sit in on the committee‘s meetings.479 The special regulation in 
regards to security policy also includes denying parliament the right to conduct financial 
reviews of either the GCSB or the SIS.
480
 This is remarkable considering the budget for the 
GCSB has been increased around 150 per cent in the last decade: from NZ$21 million in 
1999/2000 to NZ$54 million in 2009/10.
481
 
Kennedy Graham marked the GCSB as an ―intelligence organisation which 'spies' 
electronically on private communications‖482 and stated ―that New Zealand's international 
relations, defence and security needs are not well served by spying on private 
communications between our Pacific neighbours and New Zealand and therefore we [the 
Green Party] will abolish the GCSB and close its two signals intelligence bases at Waihopai 
and Tangimoana immediately.‖483 Assuming the Greens would come into power, they claim 
they will immediate close down the agency. In case the Greens cannot gain significant 
influence after the next election they present an alternative, favouring the idea of putting an 
Inspector-General as an independent watchdog over the government‘s intelligence and 
security assembly.
484
  
However, the ‗Waihopai-issue‘ became a field of its own in the Green Party‘s agenda. The 
war in Afghanistan helped greatly to promote the issue and raise New Zealander‘s awareness 
of the topic. An anti-spy-base protest movement has formed around the issue and the Greens 
welcome and support this development. The topic still has relevance and a connection to New 
Zealand‘s involvement in Afghanistan, and in that way helps the Greens to put a spotlight on 
the national foreign, defence and security policy. The Green Party foreign affairs policy points 
out: 
„We therefore oppose New Zealand support in, or involvement in, the current 
United States-led coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan (but support UN 
peace-building action there). We also oppose assisting such military operations 
through intelligence gathering and therefore support closure of the satellite 
communications interception station at Waihopai, (which is integrated into a US-
led global electronic intelligence network).‖485 
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6.12 SAS 2009-2011 
After the 2008 election in which National came to power, New Zealand‘s approach shifted 
back to the earlier strategy of approving SAS deployments. While in 2009 the public 
discussion about a possible re-deployment of SAS troops to Afghanistan went on, Kennedy 
Graham highlighted the fact that no UN-resolution had ever authorised Operation Enduring 
Freedom and the troop deployment in 2001 had been unlawful in the first place; at least 
according to the standards of international law. Therefore, ―[i]t would be folly for New 
Zealand to agree to any further deployment of its SAS in Afghanistan without an explicit 
mission mandate from the UN Security Council.‖486 When Graham questioned the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Murray McCully, about the legal conditions of the deployments of the PRT 
as well as the SAS, McCully failed to provide an appropriate answer. Instead the Foreign 
Minister tried to use the authorisation of the PRT, given by UN resolutions 1368 and 1373, to 
justify New Zealand‘s participation in Operation Enduring Freedom from 2001-05.487 Also 
he thereby implied this might be satisfactory to justify a re-deployment of the SAS in 
Afghanistan in 2009, but, as Graham highlighted, the military operation had never received a 
UN authorisation.
488
 
Locke also stressed the absence of UN-authorisation and pointed out that the American appeal 
to Article 51 and the right of self-defence would hardly cover the invasion of another country 
because of a single terrorist attack.
489
 Graham called the UN member states claim for self-
defence in Asia in 2009 after attacks which happened in America in 2001 seriously into 
question.
490
 Additionally Locke noted: ―Certainly, New Zealand cannot claim an argument of 
self-defence for sending the SAS to Afghanistan.‖491 Graham again called upon the 
government „to provide an assurance that, under the current legal situation, there will be no 
further SAS deployment by this country to Afghanistan as part of Operation Enduring 
Freedom.―492 
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However, Prime Minister and National Party leader John Key eventually announced in 
August 2009 the government would send the SAS troops back to Afghanistan. The United 
States had made repeated requests in this regard and according to Key they were ―supportive 
[and] grateful that New Zealand is playing its part."
493
 With global solidarity for the 
intervention fading away bit by bit since 2001, US neo-liberal think tanks had strongly 
recommended boosting the troop commitments in Afghanistan, putting pressure on NATO 
members that were spending less than 2 per cent of GDP on defence, and taking another 
round of enlargement within NATO.
494
 This claim was – among other nations – targeted 
towards ‗Down Under‘.  
Indeed, non-European, non-NATO allies such as Australia and New Zealand, although not 
formal partners of NATO have been among the most significant contributors to the ISAF 
mission. In particular Australia has contributed nearly as many troops as NATO‘s own 
primary contributors and became thereby the largest non-NATO contributor to ISAF. When 
Australia announced in April 2009 it would increase its troop contribution to Afghanistan by 
nearly 50 per cent, the New Zealand government was indirectly pressured to decide between 
going along with the ally or bailing out.
495
 Murray McCully defended the government‘s 
decision as it had been made under strong consideration of New Zealand‘s national interests: 
―New Zealanders are highly mobile people. New Zealand nationals travel in planes and they 
stay in hotel rooms and resorts. Where terrorists strike around the world, the chances are that 
New Zealanders will be at risk. All New Zealanders today have a strong interest in reducing 
the threat of international terrorism and the ability of Afghanistan to play host to the terrorist 
groups that are present there.‖496 
Under increasing pressure from the United States and Australia – and for the sake of Kiwis 
travelling around the world – the Key-led government eventually agreed to provide from 2009 
to 2011 three rotations of approximately 70 SAS troops to ISAF. However, the future role of 
the PRT was left open by the government. Questions by the Greens referring to rumours that 
the PRT will be withdrawn while the SAS re-deployment went ahead were not adequately 
answered in parliament. The government claimed the decision regarding the PRT had not 
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been made yet.
497
 While the PRT – in contrast to the SAS – enjoys a good reputation for 
rebuilding Afghan infrastructure, the government eventually decided the team should be 
gradually withdrawn during the SAS deployment. The PRT had been located in the Bamiyan 
province since 2003, changed from US command to NATO command in 2006, and was now 
expected to be completely withdrawn between 2012 and 2014.
498
  
The Greens were outraged and launched an urgent debate in parliament stressing the public 
importance of the subject. Locke called the Afghan Karzai-government utterly corrupt and the 
war unjustifiable. Moreover he noted that New Zealand‘s involvement not only raised legal 
and practical, but also moral issues amongst Kiwis. ―Half of the New Zealand people, 
according to public opinion polls, are against the commitment of our special forces, as well, 
and today in Parliament, the Green Party is trying to represent their views.―499   
Indeed, according to a poll published by Research New Zealand in early August 2009 nearly 
61 per cent of respondents had favoured the deployment of PRT until September 2010. 
Equally, New Zealanders were divided on whether to re-send SAS soldiers back or not. Forty-
seven per cent of those interviewed supported the measure and 44 per cent opposed it.
500
 After 
the ISAF commander, General Stanley McChrystal, said in early May 2010 he wanted New 
Zealand troops to stay longer than originally agreed, John Key responded he would consider 
this.
501
 The numbers in a poll conducted later that month dropped even further and gave clear 
evidence of New Zealander‘s discontent: 77 per cent preferred some type of pullout, with 40 
per cent asking for a complete withdrawal and 37 per cent favouring a partial withdrawal. Ten 
per cent wanted all troops to remain and the rest were unsure.
502
 
Labour and opposition leader Phil Goff criticised the government‘s decision to re-deploy SAS 
troops in 2009 and raised doubts about whether the war in Afghanistan could really be won by 
sending in more troops. He pointed out that the war itself had changed over the years: from a 
fight against Al-Qaeda cells and the Taleban in Kabul, it had developed slowly into a civil 
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war affecting large parts of the country and including local conflicts between different ethnic, 
religious, and political groups.
503
 He believed the only way to ‗win‘ the conflict would be by 
supporting the civilian society. From his perspective New Zealand has been „doing that most 
competently and effectively through the PRT in Bamyan."
504
  
The Greens raised concerns about the SAS practise of handing over Afghan prisoners to US 
soldiers who then subsequently mistreated them. According to Jon Stephenson, ―Prisoners 
taken in Afghanistan by non-United States forces are generally transferred to Afghani 
authorities, who have been implicated in cases of mistreatment, torture and extra-judicial 
executions.―505 However, the incidents referred to in this context mostly happened in 2002 
when the SAS troops had been in Afghanistan with the approval of the Labour/ Alliance 
coalition. New Zealand had been accused of breaking the ‗Geneva Convention‘ by handing 
over prisoners to the US, even when it was generally known that the prisoners were likely to 
be mistreated. Human rights activist Michael Ratner stated in this regard: "It was obvious to 
everybody what was going on […] The New Zealand authorities knew that turning prisoners 
over to the Americans was very likely or very possibly going to cause inhumane treatment. 
How could New Zealand, no matter what the United States said, give up their obligations 
under the Convention?"
506
 Keith Locke provided a critical explanation for this: ―New Zealand 
[…] wrongly accepted the US definition that Afghan prisoners were not 'prisoner-of-war' 
because they usually didn't wear uniforms. Our Government has refused to recognise that a 
1977 Protocol to the Geneva Conventions covered insurgent forces, who commonly don't 
wear a uniform.―507  
In fact, Locke had already tried using the matter as a vehicle to impair the government‘s 
decision making in early August. He claimed that any decision on whether SAS contingents 
should return to Afghanistan „must be postponed pending an inquiry into whether there was 
mistreatment of prisoners the NZ Special Air Service (SAS) handed over to American forces 
in an earlier deployment.―508 Seemingly untouched by this past experience John Key proposed 
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to re-deploy troops in 2009, and that the handing over of prisoners to the US-allies would 
remain the usual and expected procedure in the future.
509
 Green MP Kennedy Graham 
therefore called National‘s decision an example of "strategic folly based on muddled 
thinking"
510
 and argued the deployment of the SAS troops would „compromise the legitimacy 
and the effectiveness of the work done by our PRT."
511
 Finally, he also made a very clear 
distinction between the ISAF and the Operation Enduring Freedom. According to Graham, 
the Greens ―judge the International Security Assistance Force, which is a peace-building 
mission authorised by the United Nations Security Council, to be legal in international law; 
Operation Enduring Freedom, which is a counter-terrorism campaign, is not.―512 
6.13 Conclusion 
From the Green‘s perspective, the Afghanistan case differs fundamentally from New 
Zealand‘s involvement in East Timor and the Solomon Islands. While the engagements in 
East Timor and the Solomons were requested by the locals – or at least the approval of the 
respective governments – the Afghanis did not ask for intervention, resulting in an upsurge of 
strong nationalist feelings and aggressive resistance amongst some southern Afghanis against 
the ISAF troops. Simply put, the Greens see RAMSI and INTERFET as peacekeeping 
operations while the involvement in Afghanistan is perceived as participation in a counter-
productive war.  
The fact that the Greens opposed the involvement in Afghanistan from the beginning offers an 
opportunity to examine their influence on New Zealand‘s decision-making in terms of foreign 
affairs. The SAS deployment in 2001 itself serves as evidence that their impact on this 
particular issue was limited. They opposed the government‘s action but failed to stop it. 
However, their constant campaigning against the deployment – in a concerted effort with 
likeminded people and other progressive parties – placed enough pressure on the Labour 
government so that it finally agreed not to re-deploy the SAS in 2005. Keith Locke claimed 
credit for the Greens in terms of representing this anti-war movement and giving the 
protesters an official voice in parliament.
513
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The re-deployment under the National Party in 2009 again showed that the opportunities for 
an opposition party to significantly influence the decision-making process on a national level 
remained limited. While the Green Party expressed its disagreement with John Key‘s decision 
both publically and in parliament, in the end it remained unable to stop it. The Green‘s only 
strength is to raise public awareness and encourage public protest. They accomplish this by 
pointing out the domestic issues that arose from the war in Afghanistan; e.g. the Waihopai 
‗spy base‘ or the passing of anti-terrorist legislation. These topics are of great concern to New 
Zealanders due to their effects on everyday life. The Green Party has used this detour to 
maintain public interest in the war in Afghanistan. With the recent escalation in combat and 
widespread violence in Afghanistan, the Greens would also argue for a complete withdrawal 
of New Zealand‘s troops; including the PRT as they do not want to see them drawn into 
battle.
514
 The first loss of a New Zealand PRT member in August 2010
515
 made it obvious that 
it is hard to draw a clear division between peacekeeping efforts and combat action in 
Afghanistan. 
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7 Conclusion 
This thesis explores the views and positions of the New Zealand Green Party on critical issues 
concerning conflict and war. The New Zealand Green Party emerged out of the peace 
movement of the early 1970s, adding environment activists and protesters for equal rights as it 
grew in size and influence. There is widespread agreement that the viability and success of the 
party is linked to its ability to stay true to its original purpose and key values while a building 
a political institution.
516
 The three cases explored here – interventions in Timor, the Solomon 
Islands and Afghanistan are interesting examples for exploring how the party has sought to 
reconcile its principles with the demands of practical politics.  A key position for the Greens 
is that the cause for any intervention must be just and morally defendable.
517
 As has been 
shown, they found reasons for supporting the deployments to East Timor and the Solomon 
Islands, e.g. the gross disregarding of human rights, the invitation of foreign troops by the 
host countries, and the backing of the UN and the PIF. They did not find such reasons in the 
Afghanistan case and therefore continue to campaign against it. According to Paul Buchanan, 
one simple way of determining the justness of a war is the scope of its international backing. 
The authorisation of an intervention by the UN Security Council or General Assembly is seen 
as especially important in this regard.
518
 From a Green perspective, the case of East Timor is 
considered to have been a just and necessary multilateral intervention, while the war in 
Afghanistan is considered as an occupation of a foreign country for the sake of retaliation and 
the grasp on resources.  The Green Party vehemently opposed any New Zealand participation 
in the US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. They still  
―oppose New Zealand support in, or involvement in, the current United States led 
coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan (but support UN peace-building action 
there). [They] also oppose assisting such military operations through intelligence 
gathering and therefore support closure of the satellite communications 
interception station at Waihopai, (which is integrated into a US -led global 
electronic intelligence network).‖519  
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Stephen Levine said the party has ―a fairly sceptical view of measures intended to cope with 
the threat of international terrorism. Defence is simply not a priority for the Greens.‖520 This 
statement is true to a certain extent, but perhaps does not do justice to the Green‘s efforts in 
the realm of foreign affairs. 
The thesis demonstrates that the Green Party‘s impact on government policy with respect to 
New Zealand‘s foreign affairs has been generally limited. This is not surprising. With its 
isolated geographic position and small population, New Zealand is an excellent example of a 
state where most foreign issues are seen from a similar perspective across all parties. As one 
former foreign minister notes, ―[A]lmost all foreign affairs legislation presented to the 
Parliament [in the recent past] has received near unanimous support.‖521 The examples of the 
Solomon Islands and East Timor underline this thesis in a very clear manner. Even if the 
Greens had opposed New Zealand‘s contribution to INTERFET or RAMSI it is unlikely that 
they would have been able to stop them. First, they would have had insufficient backing, as 
the majority of the population, as well as the other parties, endorsed both missions. Second, 
they remained in opposition, or as a subordinate coalition partner to the government, and 
thereby had only negligible influence on the legislation.  
Nonetheless, the Greens were not neutral or irrelevant political actors and they did see 
defence issues as vitally important.  They were active participants in public and parliamentary 
debates about these interventions.  As the third largest party in parliament their words have 
certain significance. In New Zealand‘s small political environment, one with a history of 
trying different political approaches, it is an advantage to have colourful and passionate 
representatives; such factors at least guarantee constant media attention and thereby public 
awareness.
522
 In the recent past the Greens have made effective use of their ability to raise 
public awareness and provoke debate, as can be seen concerning in the context of New 
Zealand‘s contribution to ISAF. 
On the one hand the Afghanistan case also highlights the Green Party‘s limited power. Their 
opposition to the contribution as a whole had no effect on the government‘s decision making 
in 2001. On the other hand they were capable of influencing the Labour-government to 
withdraw parts of the contributed NZDF, and not to re-deploy the SAS in 2005. However, it 
has to be noted that they were not alone on the issue. Many members of the Alliance and 
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influential parts of the Labour Party did not approve the government‘s contribution to 
Operation Enduring Freedom either.  
Keith Locke acknowledges this fact but also claims the Green Party deserves credit for 
―creating the public opposition and being a voice of the public opposition.‖523 Unlike most 
other parties, in particular the mainstream parties, the Greens have consistently opposed the 
war in Afghanistan since 2001. They have done so in two ways. First, by publicising the issue 
constantly through their media output; second by supporting peace rallies and protests 
campaigns; and third by linking the Afghanistan deployment and the ‗global war on terror‘ to 
domestic consequences for New Zealanders, including the modification of laws, the impact on 
people‘s privacy and civil rights, as well as increased defence spending. 
As Robert Patman has noted, ―New Zealand has witnessed, like many other states, the 
blurring of the distinction between ‗foreign‘ and ‗domestic‘ issues that is so central to the 
Westphalian state.‖524 The Greens were able to exploit this blurring by linking ‗foreign‘ topics 
to their domestic consequences. As public interest in domestic issues can be – generally 
speaking – considered higher than public interest in foreign affairs, the Green Party found a 
way to put pressure on the government: they directed the public interest from crises overseas 
to the domestic consequences resulting from such crises.  The best examples include the use 
of the intercept facility in Waihopai, the passing of the Terrorism Suppression Act or the 
training of Indonesian military officers on New Zealand soil. They still ―[s]eek the reversal of 
anti-terrorist legislation that violates any non-derogable human rights norms.‖525 
Critics might argue that the Green Party still could have taken stronger measures to put 
pressure on the government when the decision was made to send troops to Afghanistan in 
2001. Since the Clark Labour government depended to a certain degree on the Greens support 
in other political fields – something assured through the somewhat unofficial agreement on 
confidence and supply at that time – the Green Party could have exploited this particular 
situation by threatening to cancel the agreement. However, they did not.
526
.  Their failure to 
do so, has led some to argue that the Greens only use the rhetoric of peace and non-violence 
for self-promotion while at the same time approving and supporting foreign troop 
                                                            
523 Interview with Keith Locke, Wellington, 13 October 2010. 
524 Patman, Globalisation, Sovereignty and the Transformation of New Zealand Foreign Policy, p.15.     
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deployments in areas of conflict. Thus the Greens stances on issues of war and peace have 
been called contradictory, manipulative, and even fraudulent.
527
 As James Page has put it:  
―The strange thing about the Greens is the belief that they are actually ethically 
different to wider society and to other political parties. It is difficult to avoid the 
conclusion that the continued use of the language of nonviolence and peace within 
Green pronouncements is a means to garnering electoral support. If this is the case, 
then it makes the leadership of the Greens worse than the most openly pro-war 
political parties, who at least have the virtue of honesty.‖528  
However, this argument appears fairly weak since Green Parties indeed oppose military 
actions by voting against them in their national parliaments, organising peace rallies, and 
generally raising public awareness. Also the argument that pro-war parties could be 
considered as more honest seems dubious; parties that would label themselves as ‗pro-war‘ 
are rare and hard to find in the political spectrum. Both National‘s and Labour‘s secrecy in 
regards to New Zealand‘s troop contributions to Afghanistan underline the fact that no 
mainstream party has an interest in presenting herself as a war monger. 
The Greens supported New Zealand‘s foreign troop deployment in the Solomon Islands as 
well as East Timor and declared those cases as ―successful peacemaking experience‖529. In 
both cases the political circumstances matched the Greens‘ criteria of a ―Responsibility to 
Protect‖530. Both interventions followed from a humanitarian crisis and political turmoil and 
in both cases the interventions had been endorsed by large parts of the international 
community.  
In fact, in case of the Solomons the Greens even made an exception from their principle of 
exclusively supporting foreign troop deployments with an UN-mandate. As was pointed out in 
chapter four, such a mandate could not have been provided to the RAMSI mission for various 
reasons. For the sake of protecting the Solomon Island population from violence and 
harassment, the Greens accepted the authorisation of RAMSI by the PIF as sufficient. Surely 
the fact that the mission was unanimously supported by all 16 PIF member states as well as 
the invitation by the Solomon government made it easier for the Green Party to approve it.
531
 
If the Green Party had opposed New Zealand‘s contribution to RAMSI they would have been 
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accused of not taking responsibility for the defence of human rights. Indeed, they have been 
indirectly criticised by left-wing activists who claim New Zealand was ―successfully 
exporting the war‘s agenda of neo-liberalism to the Pacific Islands.‖532 Furthermore, parts of 
the Green Party are not completely satisfied with the New Zealand and Australian influence 
on the restructuring of the local administration. Placing New Zealanders and Australians in 
key positions within different government departments might not have benefitted the 
Solomons‘ political and economic development, or the interests of the Solomon population.  
―It was not totally sensitive to Solomon Islands‘ concerns; that was more importing 
the fairly deregulated model of Australian/ New Zealand society. There have been 
problems with the model that has been in its political side associated with the 
military side. The quicker the RAMSI operation can be completed in the Solomon 
Islands and the people in their police force and their civil service can run the 
country on their own the better.‖533   
In case of East Timor the decision to join the coalition of supporters for an intervention was 
relatively easy for the Green Party. There had been a wide range of reasons to support 
interference in the conflict, for example the breakdown of law and order, the humanitarian 
crisis, the refugee problem, the Indonesian request for assistance from external forces, the 
UN-mandate and the Timorese desire for independence expressed in a democratic ballot.. For 
the resolution of most of these problems and for the democratic development that took place 
in Timor Leste after the intervention, the UN-led operation can still be justified and seen as a 
success. However, as much as the Greens supported the original mission they still critique the 
nature of the operation today, which according to Keith Locke has been  ―a bit too biased to 
Western precepts in terms of nation-building and the role of the big agencies there, like the 
United Nations.‖534.  
As in the case of Afghanistan, the Green Party linked a domestic issue to the commitment in 
East Timor. By putting pressure on the government to exclude Indonesian military staff from 
NZDF training and exercises they ensured that New Zealand made clear on which side it 
stood. The exclusion was seen as necessary to demonstrate that New Zealand would not act in 
a hypocritical way, supporting the East Timorese struggle for independence on the one hand, 
while at the same time maintaining military ties to the TNI on the other. 
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However, both cases, the Solomons and East Timor, offer only a very limited chance to 
determine the Green‘s impact on foreign affairs decision making on a national level. Both 
cases underline the fact that the Greens recognise New Zealand‘s – and consequently their 
own – responsibility to deal with armed conflicts within and between neighbouring states. The 
need for governments to work constructively together to address such conflicts can justify the 
use of force, and contributions to foreign troop deployments. This counts in particular for 
―inter-state aggression or intra-state situations of genocide or the gross and systematic 
violation of human rights.‖535 
This thesis has argued that decisions about the use of military force are highly sensitive issues 
that need to be weighed carefully and with great responsibility by political leaders. No 
political party, especially a Green Party, should take this responsibility lightly or use it for 
self-promotion purposes. But since conflicts remain part of New Zealand‘s neighbourhood 
they have to be resolved in some way. In a globalised world where states interact on bilateral 
and multilateral levels, conflicts can easily cross borders and affect neighbouring states. 
Therefore, a party which presents itself rhetorically as standing for the non-violent resolution 
of conflicts should do the best it can to avoid the use of force, otherwise it risks facing the 
charge of hypocrisy. The Green Party of New Zealand has, like most other Green parties 
around the world, a reputation for strongly advocating for peace. This thesis concludes that 
the New Zealand Greens decide on their support for foreign troop deployments on a case-by-
case basis. Certain key factors have to be considered – such as the political circumstances in 
the host country, the compatibility of the mission with international law, approval from the 
United Nations or other supra-national agencies – and these eventually shape discussions 
within the Party. However, as long as the party remains in opposition their impact on the 
decision making process on a governmental level is restricted to criticism, debate and in the 
best case raising public awareness.   
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